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Current History

THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

THE SOVIET UNION, 1958

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Current History

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The urgency of understanding events inside the Soviet Union has been graphically illustrated by the Sputniks. How strong is the Soviet Union? What is her industrial and military potential? These problems should be studied in the light of Russian politics. In the first of six articles on the Soviet Union, we read of the two-fold importance of Khrushchev's policies: "1. They reflect strength rather than weakness and 2. they represent a tactical change in the foreign arena of first magnitude."

Changing Russian Politics

BY JULIAN TOWSTER

Professor of Political Science, University of California.

THE startling successes of Soviet science and technology symbolized by the recent testing of an I.C.B.M. and the launching of Sputniks in the skies, and the new diplomatic offensive of the U.S.S.R. have raised the question of a fresh reassessment of the strength and significance of the Khrushchev regime and its policies.

Three Main Political Changes. Three major political changes marked Khrushchev's rise to a dominant position in the Soviet polity by the summer of 1957: (1) a radical revamping and reorganization of the Party and Soviet summits, (2) a reassertion of the principle of Party primacy, and (3) a new diplomatic offensive. The first two are of particular importance.

Until the Nineteenth Party Congress in October, 1952, the highest policy-making body in the land—the Politburo—was stabilized at a membership of 14: 10 regular, i.e., voting, members, and 4 candidates. In part to introduce new blood into this body and prepare it for his succession, and in part as one measure in a scheme for a new purge of the leadership, Stalin had the Politburo enlarged to 36 and renamed it Presidium of the Central Committee. When he died six months later, the hard core of his closest lieutenants quickly excluded all the new-

comers and reduced the Presidium to its former size. At the Twentieth Party Congress in February, 1956, the membership of the Party Presidium was raised to 17 and as an aftermath of the shake-up of the leadership last June it was raised again to 24 (15 members and 9 candidates). Now, with the ouster of Zhukov, the membership of this ruling body stands at 23.

If even after the Twentieth Party Congress seven of the full members were still men of the old guard handpicked by Stalin since the 1920's, the new Presidium is predominantly a Khrushchev creation. At least eight of the fourteen voting members and six of the nine candidates can be considered Khrushchev men. With the ouster of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich, only three members of the old ruling kernel (besides Khrushchev)—namely Bulganin, Mikoyan and Voroshilov—are left in the Party Presidium and even if they were to combine with two or three more members (Shvernik, Kusinen, perhaps Suslov) they would still remain in the voting minority. The exclusion of Marshal Zhukov after a mere four months of full membership in this body further strengthens Khrushchev's position at the Party summit.

The change at the Party summit was ac-

accompanied by an extraordinary transformation of the Soviet summit—the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and the Council as a whole. It may be remembered that in the past the Presidium of the Council of Ministers—comprising the Premier and his deputies—in fact consisted of the very men who formed the basic nucleus of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party. Of the seven deputy premiers who together with Premier Bulganin comprised this body—namely Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Pervukhin, Saburov and Kuzmin—only two retained their posts after the summer shake-up: Mikoyan and Kuzmin. Thus, there is not much left of this once crucial body at the peak of the Soviet pyramid.

Not only the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, but the Council as a whole has diminished in status and stature following the May reorganization which set up 105 regional economic councils and transferred a substantial share of operative control over production to the level of the constituent republics. The number of ministries at the center was reduced from 52 to 25 and the very nature of the Council of Ministers was altered by admitting—for the first time—the Premiers of the 15 Union Republics as *ex officio* members and by providing for the appointment of branch chiefs of the State Planning Committee as full-fledged Ministers in the Council. For the time being at least, these changes have reduced considerably the importance of the Council of Ministers as an organ of supreme supervision and control over policy implementation and execution.

The reshuffling of the ministries and reorganization of economic management, entailing the transfer of thousands of officials and directors from the center to the localities, was carried out against fairly strong opposition and represents a clear demonstration of the Party's supremacy over the managerial bureaucracy. Other recent examples of a decisive reassertion of the principle of Party primacy concern the role of literature and the arts in Soviet society and the position of the army command in the polity.

No society functions rhythmically without a stable framework of ethics. Youth espe-

cially needs the steadying hand of moral tradition. The Marxist ethics can be termed an ethical relativism in the service of an ethical absolutism. If, in order to waylay the fears of the revolting masses with regard to destruction of the dominant social order, Marxist ethics taught that there were no eternal moral values, that all morality was relative, serving in each historical period the selfish interests of the then dominant class, the same ethics also held forth the vision of a future utopia in which equity and justice would find their highest realization.

Ethics and the Party

Raised on this kind of moral fare, the Soviet people were told for decades that under the genius of Stalin's leadership the Communist Party reared in Russia the most just and progressive order in the world. The toppling of Stalin from the heights of a semi-deity and the revelations of the crimes of his era opened a great void in the moral sphere. As the contents of Khrushchev's secret speech detailing these crimes became known in the summer of 1956, bewilderment and confusion gripped the more sensitive strata of the urban intelligentsia—the student youth and literati—and painful queries came to the fore. How could such crimes take place in a socialist society? Were the iniquities of Stalinism the moral tradition in the name of which endless sacrifices were exacted? Where were the roots of such monstrous evils and what was the guarantee that they would not recur?

The October events in Poland and Hungary compounded the intellectual turmoil and dismay. University students in Moscow, Sverdlovsk and other places rose to ask the true explanation of those events and walked out on lecturers who referred them to the Party press. Conscience-stricken literati, laboring under a sense of guilt for their contributions to the myth of Stalinist infallibility, spoke up to assert an author's right to "creative integrity" and blamed the stagnation and sterility in Soviet art and literature on the requirement of so-called "socialist realism" to accentuate the positive in Soviet life.

In what amounts to a revolt against the demands of "socialist realism," a number of young writers, taking advantage of the "thaw" allowed them in the post-Stalin period and of the de-Stalinization campaign after the last Party congress, proceeded to describe Soviet reality as they saw it. Others openly complained of "excessive tutelage" and voiced demands for further curtailment of the literary censorship. The timing of these assertions with the Polish and Hungarian revolts was an unfortunate coincidence. As the writers' portrayals and demands edged closer to the seat of power, as they appeared to point a finger at the Soviet system itself, Khrushchev and his lieutenants decided that the intellectual liberties of the post-Stalin period had gone too far.

Soviet students were warned that they are studying at the expense of the workers and that "violations of discipline" among them will not be tolerated. In a vigorous campaign launched in December, 1956, and directed primarily at leaders of the intellectual ferment in the Moscow and Leningrad writers' unions, high Party officials denounced the cultural non-conformists as "demagogues" whose criticisms fed grist to the imperialist mill, and demanded that they recant their errors. It took a series of writers' meetings extending over seven months before the Party officials finally succeeded in breaking down what they called the writers' "conspiracy of silence," and the recalcitrant writers capitulated in June.

The campaign was rounded out in a major statement by Khrushchev published in *Pravda* on August 28. Lashing out at writers who complain of "the fettering of initiative" by the Party and the State, or who emphasize the negative aspects of Soviet life, Khrushchev insisted that the method of "socialist realism" and the requirement of *Partiinost* (Party spirit) are paramount in present conditions: "There is a sharp conflict in the world today between two ideologies, the socialist and bourgeois, and in this conflict there can be no neutrals." By way of practical measures, the editorial boards of a number of publications were changed and—in part as a reward to the provincial writers' unions for the greater political reliability which they have shown in the crisis

—control over publishing houses and royalties exercised earlier by the Moscow Writers' Union was decentralized. The post-Stalin thaw in the realm of the spirit is almost over.

The removal of Zhukov at the end of October from the Defense Ministry, Central Committee and Presidium of the Central Committee constitutes the third stage of Khrushchev's effort to reestablish the undisputed recognition of the Party's control over all phases of Soviet life. The ease with which it was accomplished points up sharply the fallacy of analyses which interpreted Zhukov's rise in the military and Party hierarchy as proof of the army's independent role and of the Marshal's own approach to supreme power.

With the aid of a vast system of indoctrination the army has been fashioned over the years into a faithful instrument of the Party leadership. By 1955, 77 per cent of the armed forces were Party affiliated. As for any unified opposition of the military command to the Party leaders, at least three considerations militate against it: (1) the officer cadres are carefully selected and are themselves indoctrinated to the highest degree. Figures supplied by Marshal Vasilevsky in 1952 show that over 74 per cent of the graduates of the "universities of Marxism-Leninism" were commanders, and 86.4 per cent of the officers and generals were Party or Komsomol members; (2) in the second place, there is no uniformity of social background or highly-developed sense of class solidarity among the commanders, such as existed among the German Junkers; (3) and thirdly, the Party leaders have always been able to operate on the principle of *divide and rule* with regard to the high command, exploiting personality differences and using the powers of appointment, transfer and promotion—such as the wholesale promotion of 12 generals to the rank of Marshal in March, 1955—to maintain a desirable balance among them.

The fact that not one of the six members and twelve candidates in the Central Committee from the high command is reported to have supported Zhukov at the session which ousted him illustrates the point. The alleged major issue of the showdown was

the question of political education in the armed forces, i.e., the system of political officers in the army and the share of authority which they are to exercise. Over the past 40 years political commissars or officers under various names, with authority equal to the military commanders, were established three times and abolished three times in alternate efforts to maintain and to end dual control in the army.

It must be stressed, however, that even in periods when duality of control was removed, political officers were still maintained in the army as deputy commanders. These political officers are directed by the Chief Political Administration of the Army which is simultaneously a Department of the Central Committee and reports directly to the Party leaders. Thus, the system of Party surveillance was never abandoned. Presumably Khrushchev chose to inflate the issue of "commander vs. commissar" at this time in order to assert unequivocally the Party's dominant role and remove Zhukov from the policy-making summit. Thus, Khrushchev is virtually in the driver's seat now.

Context of Changes

How, it may be asked, did he get that far? How did he manage to rise to the pinnacle of power? In the small circle of the highest ruling summit—the Party Presidium—men move to the fore on the basis of internal alignments crystallized around specific issues, but depending also on the organizational backing a leader can mobilize behind him. Khrushchev owes his initial climb to power to a series of successful guesses with regard to agriculture, industry and foreign policy, but like Stalin before him he was able to clinch his victory over competitors only after a series of organizational measures which in time resulted in a packed Central Committee.

As mounting differences over policies and position were to show, the equilibrium among Stalin's heirs—established in the form of a "collective leadership" which was particularly emphasized at the time of Beria's liquidation in July, 1953—was not an easy one. Khrushchev's creation of some 75,000 new Party jobs in agriculture soon after he

was appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee in September, 1953, was a first installment in building a body of Khrushchev partisans. Following Malenkov's and Molotov's criticism of the virgin lands program proposed by Khrushchev in February, 1954, the latter took advantage of Republic and regional Party elections to secure a membership turnover of over one-third in the Republic Central Committees and of one- to two-thirds in the secretariats and lower Party committees.

Apparently feeling the strength of the Party's organizational backing following this purge, Khrushchev ousted Malenkov from the Premiership in February, 1955, humiliated Molotov over an ideological error later in the year, and even convoked six months ahead of schedule the Twentieth Party Congress which gave him the packed Central Committee that is now backing all his moves.¹ That Party Congress was to be a great stepping stone to the country's and his own glory. The grand strategic design presented to it in February, 1956, was intended:

(1) to cement the loyalty of the Soviet people through a series of promises with regard to wages, working hours, pensions, housing and consumer goods; (2) to bind the East European peoples to the U.S.S.R. through economic specialization and greater political autonomy; (3) to win over Socialists by doctrinal revisions recognizing many roads to socialism; (4) to attract colonial countries by special peace appeals and expanded economic and military aid programs; and (5) to lull and divide the West by public disavowal of Marxist teachings about the inevitability of war and the use of violence to overthrow capitalism.

However, the optimistic expectations concerning the prospects of this design were shattered by unexpected consequences of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech before the same congress. The ideological turmoil which followed, the defections of Communists and fellow travelers abroad, the ferment at home, and the revolts in Poland and Hungary in October-November, 1956, gave the opposition a chance for a full scale

¹ 79 of the 133 voting members of the C. C. are Party functionaries, i.e., predominantly First Secretaries, subordinate to and partisans of Khrushchev.

attack. At the December, 1956, Central Committee Plenum, Khrushchev suffered a temporary defeat which took the outer form of plan revisions and a revamping of the State Economic Commission. By February, 1957, however, he was able to rally his forces and launch his radical plan for reorganization of the economy, and by the end of June he turned the tables on his opponents and removed Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich from all responsible positions at the center. Thus, though the theory of "collective leadership" will no doubt be maintained, Khrushchev is no longer merely "the first among equals," but in Orwell's apt phrase he is "more equal" than the others. He is now where Stalin was in 1928—only an insignificant few with established prestige remain in the Party Presidium.

Internal and External Consequences

The over-all lesson which Khrushchev gives every evidence of having drawn from the vicissitudes of the last few years is that the threat of force is an indispensable instrument of Soviet politics at home and abroad. By combining once more the stick with the carrot he has achieved a large measure of stabilization on the domestic scene. The literary intelligentsia has been effectively reminded who butters its bread and in its overwhelming majority Soviet youth knows that conformism is the price of a career. In the second half of 1957, travelers in the Soviet Union could find few signs of any asking of the "eternal questions"—of the idealism or revolutionary fervor so characteristic of the Russian intelligentsia of the last century.

On the whole, the demeanor of young people was cautious, resigned, very practical and prosaic. The dominant motive among youth is good jobs and safe careers, just as the dominant interest of the populace at large is meat, milk and gadgets. Khrushchev correctly estimated the overwhelming sentiment of the Soviet masses when he thundered at the literati this summer:

These sorry scholars cannot understand the important Marxist truth that people must first of all eat, drink, have homes and clothe themselves

before they are in a position to engage in politics, science and art . . . the people took power into their own hands precisely in order to develop the forces of production, to multiply society's wealth, to improve their well-being and to create better living conditions as rapidly as possible.

Khrushchev's domestic formula is simple: fear plus loaves and fishes yield a stable popular morale. Mesmerize the people by the vision of an earthly paradise of plenty and the rest will take care of itself.

In the field of foreign policy, the application of a similar calculus and a combination of shrewdness, boldness and good luck have extricated the U.S.S.R. from a particularly difficult position. No one travelling in Eastern Europe can fail to observe that the satellite peoples have learned well the tragic lesson of Hungary's brief plunge into freedom, while the leaders of the national Communist régimes—thoroughly frightened by the near success of the Hungarian Revolution—have apparently concluded that some form of unity within the Communist camp is indispensable for their own survival. This is precisely the conception which the Soviet Union wants to prevail. As far as the neutral and colonial East is concerned, the recent feats of Soviet science are expected to exert a powerful pull on this uncommitted third of mankind. And the new diplomatic offensive that Khrushchev unleashed has the dual purpose of focusing Communist attention on an outside target and extracting every advantage from the rapidly improving Soviet position in the world balance of power.

The chief significance of Khrushchev's policies is twofold: (1) they reflect strength rather than weakness and (2) they represent a tactical change in the foreign arena of first magnitude. Soviet science and technology have made great strides forward. The U.S.S.R. is training yearly six times as many technicians, nearly three times as many engineers and many more scientists than the United States. In one form or another, almost a quarter of the Soviet population is at school. The annual rate of Soviet industrial growth is more than twice that of the United States and Khrushchev is staking the future of the Soviet Union on the deci-

sion that in the conditions of atomic stalemate the battle of production will ultimately decide the crucial issue of the affiliation of mankind to one or the other of the competing camps.

No less crucial for the West is the change in tactics abroad. It seems clear beyond a shadow of doubt that since the nature of present-day weapons available to both sides makes atomic war mutually suicidal, the greatest single question before the world today is what form competition between the Soviet Union and the West will take. An analysis of Soviet intentions in 1949 posited hopes for a protracted peace on calculations by the Soviet leaders which could be summarized under two formulas: "coexistence is preferable to coextinction" and "atomic energy plus time equals ultimate trump for Communism." The public expression of these considerations has been the Soviet concept of "peaceful competition."²

Recalling this analysis in a conversation with Anastas I. Mikoyan at the United States Embassy's Fourth of July celebration last summer, the author asked the Soviet leader how the concept of "peaceful competition" can be squared with the role played by the Soviet army in the Hungarian events. The gist of Mikoyan's answer was that the Soviet Union had a mutual assistance pact with Hungary which obligated it to come to Hungary's aid upon request and that this is in fact what the U.S.S.R. did. Without going into the merits of the claim, it is obvious that the larger implications of the question were left unanswered. The conclusion seems

inescapable that what the concept of "peaceful competition" means at present is that competition will be peaceful when it suits the interests of the Soviet state, and that henceforth this concept will not prevent employment of the threat of force to maintain the Communist domain intact and to expand wherever possible Soviet influence abroad. This is the fundamental purport of the recent change in tactics which underlies the growing Soviet challenge.

The lessons for the West would seem obvious enough. Only in a renewal of vibrant and inspiring leadership, in a more basic unity in the Atlantic community, and in finding a capacity for economic retrenchment instead of the endless expansion of luxuries, can the West garner the strength and wisdom to meet the challenge of mid-century.

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² See Julian Towster, "Problems in Understanding Russia," *Forum*, Oct., 1949, pp. 200-205.

"The American intellectual and scholar today must decide, as Goethe put it, whether he is to be an anvil—or a hammer. Today, for many, the stage of the anvil, at least in its formal phases, is complete. The question he faces is whether he is to be a hammer—whether he is to give to the world in which he was reared and educated the broadest possible benefits of his learning. As one who is familiar with the political world, I can testify that we need it.

"For example: The password for all legislation, promoted by either party, is progress. But how do we tell what is progress and what is retreat? Those of us who may be too close to the issue, or too politically or emotionally involved in it, look for the objective world of the scholar. . . ."

—John F. Kennedy, *Education and Culture, The Intellectual and the Politician*, delivered at Harvard University, June 14, 1956.

Noting that "the Russians have gone rather a long way toward solving the incredibly complex problems of missile guidance," this expert comments that the Soviet military policy is "utterly forthright" and "well coordinated with her political aims."

The Russian Military

BY ALLAN S. NANES

Assistant to the Deputy Director, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress

EVER since the emergence of the Soviet Union during World War II as one of the world's two greatest powers, it has been fashionable to speak of Russia in the Churchillian phrase, "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." The rationale of Russian policies and shifts in the personnel of her ruling clique have often baffled both the layman and the expert. But in one crucial respect Soviet policy has never been enigmatic, but utterly forthright. That is in the field of military preparedness.

Here the Soviets are very strong, have been strong, and by all indications, intend to remain very strong. The whole basis of Soviet foreign policy has been predicated on the strength of the Red Army to which now must be added, of course, a missile

capability which at this writing appears to exceed our own. Fortunately, the West has not suffered from the illusion of Soviet military weakness, whatever one may think of the tactics it has pursued to meet the Soviet challenge.

Just how great, then, is this Soviet military potential? Of what does it consist? What of its human material? What doctrines govern its employment?

In 1954, an official Western source¹ summarized Soviet armed strength as follows: first, 175 regular divisions, plus about 80 regular satellite divisions. In numerical terms, the U.S.S.R., plus East Germany and the other nations of the Soviet bloc, were estimated to have over 6 million men under arms, of which 4.5 million were in the ground forces. Twenty-two Soviet divisions were said to be stationed in East Germany, the bulk of which were armored. In addition, 60 other Soviet divisions were stationed throughout satellite territory. It was estimated that 30 days after mobilization the Soviet Union could put a force of 400 divisions in the field.

According to the same summary the numerical strength of Soviet aviation amounted at that time to 20,000 planes. This was a figure that had remained relatively constant. Foreshadowing the progress of Soviet technology, a development that has become all too familiar recently, the report stated that while in 1951 only 20 per cent of the Soviet fighters were jets, by 1954 almost all were in that category. The

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¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary-General, Lord Ismay. *NATO—The First Five Years. 1949-1954.*



number of airfields capable of taking jets had been tripled between 1951 and 1954. It was also recognized that the Soviet Union was capable of putting up an effective air defense.

Soviet seapower was estimated to include over 300 submarines, of which over half were large or medium ocean-going types, 24 cruisers and 150 destroyers. A large stock of sea mines was on hand.

Finally, Russian production of tanks, mortars, and anti-tank guns was thought more than enough to supply 300 divisions. The Soviet stockpile of artillery and anti-aircraft guns was stated as being "several times" the amount required to supply that many divisions.

These figures, the officially stated NATO estimates of Russian strength in 1954, would hardly be reassuring if published today. Yet they include no estimate of Russian strength in atomic and hydrogen armaments, nor in missiles, other than to say that developments had been remarkable. If the West had cause to be disturbed by the might of the Russian war machine in 1954, how much more cause for the gravest concern it must have today!

Ground Strength

It may be urged, of course, that this statement is overdrawn, at least insofar as Soviet ground strength is concerned. After all, the Soviet government has twice announced sizeable reductions in her armed forces, one of 640,000 in the summer of 1955, and another of 1,200,000 on May 14, 1956. Surely if these cuts have been carried out there should be a substantially lower number of effectives wearing the Russian uniform today than was the case, say, in 1954. However, as the author has earlier indicated,² the West does not know whether these cuts have actually been made, and the various media of public information often contain conflicting data on this point.

The *Army Information Digest*, as quoted in *The New York Times* last summer, estimated the Soviet ground forces at 2,500,000, consisting of 100 rifle divisions, 55 mechanized divisions, and 20 tank divisions. This

adds up, of course, to 175 divisions, the same total listed three years earlier. It is possible, however, that the U.S.S.R. has kept divisional organizations intact, while reducing the size of some of them, in contrast to American policy, where divisions have been deactivated.

On the other hand, *The Times* (London) stated on May 15, 1956, that if the announced Russian cut of 1,200,000 were actually carried out it would mean demobilizing 63 divisions, a number of brigades, 3 aircraft divisions, and 30,000 Soviet troops in East Germany. This last mentioned cut was actually announced with some fanfare, the U.S.S.R. inviting the West to remove its troops from Germany too. But even this cut is not verifiable, and at the beginning of 1957 Secretary of the Army Brucker stated that there was no evidence that Russia had actually carried out her announced cut of 1,200,000. However, at least one prominent analyst of Soviet affairs believes that Russia has cut her armies, but only because she is suffering a shortage of agricultural labor,³ which could be relieved by using released army men.

But whether such reductions have actually taken place or not, Western military planners do not believe that a decrease in combat effectiveness would be involved.⁴ This estimate would seem to be borne out by statements indicating that the Soviet Union has a completely new arsenal of weapons, and reports that some of her divisions are undergoing training for nuclear warfare. Weapons said to be in the hands of the Red Army as early as the summer of 1957 included the new T-54 tank, reportedly issued "by the thousands," to combat units, a 203 mm. gun-howitzer, and a 240 mm. heavy breech-loading mortar. Both of these guns are supposed to have atomic capabilities. A pair of guns of unusual design, presumably capable of firing shells with atomic warheads, was displayed at the re-

² See "Arms and Men: 1957," *Current History*, October, 1957.

³ Bertram Wolfe, "Why Russia Had to Cut Its Armies," *New Leader*, July 25, 1956, pp. 10-11.

⁴ U. S. Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. Subcommittee on Disarmament. 84th Congress. 2nd session. Staff Study No. 5. Control and Reduction of Armaments. *Disarmament and Security in Europe*. Washington. U. S. Government Printing Office. December 11, 1956, p. 14.

view of November 7 marking the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.

In addition, according to a number of sources, the Russians have developed a new high-load, short take-off air transport. If this plane proves to be a success it should be a distinct aid in overcoming one of the reputed weaknesses of the Soviet army, namely its low-rated airlift capability. A few new heavy tanks, designated T-10's, weighing 53 tons and mounting a 122 or 130 mm. gun have also been reported.⁵ In addition the motorization of the army is evidently continuing apace.

Another potential source of weakness in the Soviet Army, in the eyes of some observers, is the fact that its leadership is now openly involved in the political struggles within the Kremlin. If the Red Army becomes too deeply involved in this recurring strife, it could conceivably suffer a loss of effectiveness. Prior to the relief of Marshal Zhukov from his post as Defense Minister it could be stated that the political problems of the Kremlin hierarchy probably had not impaired the fighting effectiveness of the Red Army. With the popular Zhukov removed from command, some loss of effectiveness through dissatisfaction might result although admittedly such a conclusion is speculative.

The human material composing the Red Army possesses the usual peasant ruggedness and stamina. During World War II, the Nazi *Voelkischer Beobachter* carried a letter from the Russian front which remarked, in reluctant admiration, "The toughness and staying power of the Soviet soldiers are almost beyond belief." In paying this tribute the Nazis were merely echoing in perhaps an exaggerated form the sentiments uttered years before by Francis V. Greene, an American officer who observed Russian troops during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, and returned to write a book about his experiences. If, as has been stated, there is little reason to believe that the involvement of the Red Army leadership in Kremlin politics has weakened the army, the viewpoint has also been advanced that there is ferment, blind and unorganized but strong, in its ranks.⁶ This might, if properly evaluated and encouraged by the West, be a

source of weakness. However the Russian soldier's long tradition of passive obedience should discourage any great expectations on this score.

Air Power

If we turn now to a discussion of the Soviet Air Force, the emphasis shifts from manpower to machines. Here again, the quality and quantity of Soviet military aviation can offer only cold comfort to the West. General Thomas D. White, when Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, estimated that the Soviets had 20,000 first line aircraft. General Twining has stated that Russia has "thousands more" aircraft in combat units than has the United States.⁷ In Europe alone, the Soviet Union and its allies dispose an air strength reported at 13,500-15,000 planes. Forthcoming hearings on the military budget may enable us to obtain a more up-to-date estimate of Soviet air strength as our military sees it.

Although Soviet aviation has been noted for its first-rate fighters, it is now evidently emphasizing bombers as well. For example, there is the huge bomber known as the Bear in NATO terminology. The Bear has been estimated as having a range of 4,000 to 5,000 miles.⁸ Yet it is powered by a turbo-prop engine of 12,000 horsepower, about twice that of the most powerful similar engine developed in the West. This engine is designed to drive the Bear at 550 mph, at an altitude of 36,000 feet, according to one source, which goes on to state that at that altitude the engine in question uses just a little more than half the fuel a comparable jet engine would consume. On this premise the Bear would have a range of about 10,000 miles.⁹

⁵ See article by Hanson Baldwin, *The New York Times*, Oct. 28, 1957, p. 6.

⁶ George Bailey, "The Road to Dishonor that Ended in Budapest," *The Reporter*, April 18, 1957, pp. 10-13.

⁷ U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Subcommittee on the Air Force, 85th Congress, 1st session. Report of the Subcommittee on the Air Force, together with minority views. *Airpower*. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, January 25, 1957, p. 65.

⁸ See Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, p. 99, and *Life*, July 9, 1956, p. 92. The Kissinger book gives the Bear a speed of 450 mph.

⁹ *Life*, May 27, 1957, p. 77.

However, assuming that the aircraft is in the 4,000 to 5,000 mile range, its strategic potential can still be increased by the use of in-flight refueling. According to one authority, the Russians have made great progress in this technique, raising their striking power to a level approximately equal to that of the United States.¹⁰

In addition to the Bear, the Soviet Union possesses at least two other highly regarded bomber types. These are known as the Bison and the Badger. The former is comparable to America's B-52, and the latter to the B-47. The Bison, a four jet airplane, has been estimated as having a speed of 560 to 610 mph, and a 3,000 to 4,000 mile range. The Badger has been rated at 560 mph top speed, with a range of 3,000 miles.¹¹ Any Soviet progress in in-flight refueling should presumably apply to these aircraft as well.

There has been some controversy both as to the numbers of these comparable aircraft possessed by the United States and the U.S.S.R., and the performance characteristics of each. A summary appearing in the *Washington Star* set American bomber strength at about 2200 B-52's, 36's and 47's, with the last-named predominating. Russia was credited with about 1100 heavy and medium bombers, with the latter predominating, and it was reported that "new estimates" showed that the Soviet bomber fleet would increase to 2100 planes. However the weight of the testimony before the Symington Subcommittee on the Air Force was that by 1959 the Soviet long range air arm would outnumber our own. As to performance, there is at least one allegation that the twin jet Badger is superior to our four jet B-47, but there is little corroborating testimony, and a good deal of opinion the other way. However there is probably less reason to question claims that the Soviet's Bear outperforms our obsolescent B-36.

Regardless of the numbers of Soviet bombing aircraft in being or the calibre of their performance, what is disconcerting is the apparent success of the Soviet Union in its production drive. The Symington Subcommittee concluded that the Soviet Union was producing more aircraft than

the United States, and General Thomas D. White has stated that the Russians "have been and are outproducing us in all categories but medium bombers. They are beating us at our own game, production."¹² Even allowing for the possible hyperbole contained in that statement, it seems that the Soviets have enjoyed an advantage over the United States in terms of an ability to cut the lead time between prototype and production. Whether this need be the case is beyond the scope of this article, but all indications point to a determined Soviet drive to achieve a real strategic air capability.

Such a development marks a departure from previous Soviet doctrine, which tended to stress the preeminence of land power, with infantry the "queen of battles." The role of aviation lay in the close support of ground troops. The newer Soviet conceptions appear to recognize the strategic role of airpower and the fact that the center of American power would be "beyond the reach of the infantry-tactical aviation team in an age when the United States is able to damage critically Russian warpower sources with fusion weapons."¹³

Confirmation of this trend in Soviet thinking came in a recent interview in *Pravda* with Marshal K. A. Vershinin, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Force. According to a leading observer the Marshal's remarks constituted the "first outward sign of an official recognition by Soviet military leadership of the supremacy of aviation over all other armed forces."¹⁴ It is paradoxical that this development should take place at a time when, in the eyes of many commentators, the days of the traditional air force are numbered by the advent of guided long-range missiles. But if the manned long-range bomber is to go into eclipse, the strategic doctrine under which missiles would be employed does not appear to differ widely

¹⁰ C. L. Sulzberger, quoting General Paul Gerardot, former Chief of French Air Staff. *The New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1957, p. 28.

¹¹ See Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 99, and *Life*, July 9, 1956, *op. cit.*

¹² See article by David C. Cooke, *Denver Post*, February 10, 1957, p. 1.

¹³ Leonard N. Beck, "Soviet Military Literature and Soviet Air Doctrine," *Air University Quarterly Review*, Spring, 1956, p. 101.

¹⁴ Isaac Deutscher, "The New Soviet Strategy," *The Reporter*, October 3, 1957, p. 10.

from that governing conventional aircraft. Indeed there is good reason to believe that the very progress the Soviets have made with their missile program has had a definite influence toward this apparent revision of strategy. Nor is there evidence that Soviet missile progress has led to any slackening of the bomber program.

If the Soviet Union appears to be accepting Western conceptions of the strategic role of airpower, there is no evidence that they are neglecting defensive aviation. The famous MIG 15 proved its capabilities in Korea. Production of these fighters has ceased, although they are still in use in the satellite air forces. The MIG 15 was succeeded by the MIG 17, which in its turn is being replaced by the MIG 19, or Farmer. The Farmer is in widespread service throughout the Soviet Air Force, and may be said to be the standard Soviet fighter at the present time. Naturally it is supersonic, and believed capable of speeds up to 900 mph. It may be compared to the American F-100, or Super Sabre. According to one source the Russians are producing the Farmer at the rate of over 300 a month.¹⁵ They have turned out an improved version of this plane, known as the Super Farmer, or MIG 21, which has been credited with a top speed of 1,200 mph.

They also have an all-weather fighter known as the Flashlight. It is a turbojet aircraft, with an estimated speed of 675 mph. Like the Farmer, it is in extensive use by the Soviet Air Force. Then there are two new light bombers, known as the Beagle and the Blowlamp. The former is a twin jet plane, with a speed of about 600 mph and a range indicated at less than 1,000 miles.¹⁶ It is not clear whether this is the airplane that the London *Economist* designated as "most sinister," in July of 1956, or that Hanson Baldwin meant when he spoke of a new Russian bomber being seen in the summer of 1957. In any event, the new fighting power of the Soviet Air Force is obviously growing. When we add to the foregoing types a helicopter capable of carrying 40 men, (one capable of carrying 70-80 men has just been reported), and the TU-104 jet transport as well, it is equally evident that the Soviets are not neglecting the logistical side of aviation. As what may

perhaps be termed conventional Soviet airpower becomes equal to our own, and indeed there are many who think it already surpasses it, it would seem only logical for the pressures on the Western alliance to be increased.

Sea Power

If we turn to the realm of seapower, we find that once again the Soviet Union is in the throes of a great building effort. That this effort is concentrated in submarines is a matter of public knowledge. Admiral Burke, our Chief of Naval Operations has set that strength at over 450. Dr. Kissinger has stated that by 1960 the Soviet Union might possess as many as 700 submarines, which would include some of the nuclear type. The Soviet construction drive in surface craft is perhaps less well known, but about a year ago the Soviets were known to have at least 24 cruisers with six more of the most modern type being built. They also had 150 destroyers, 50 of which were of postwar vintage. The construction effort is presumably continuing apace.

As far as is known, the Soviet building program does not extend to carriers. This omission may be due to some shortcoming in Soviet industry, but it is just as likely to be the result of a strategic decision by the Soviet high command. That is, resources and manpower are being committed to submarines, because submarines are deemed less vulnerable than carriers, and from the Soviet point of view offer greater possibilities for offensive operations. It takes no great strategic knowledge to realize the tremendous threat posed by Soviet submarines capable of firing an intermediate range missile. Such submarines might lie as much as 500 miles off our coast and bring the great cities of the East and even those several hundred miles inland, within range of attack.

Although the Soviet Navy does not go in for carriers, it does have a land-based air arm. The most important naval aircraft is a turbo-jet known as the Bosun, with a

¹⁵ Sulzberger, General Gerardot, *op. cit.* The writer found no other estimate to confirm or deny that of the General.

¹⁶ *Life*, July 9, 1956, *op. cit.*

reported speed of 620 mph, and a range of 3,000 miles. The total strength of Soviet naval air has been estimated at "over 3,000" planes.¹⁷

Of course the Soviet Navy is not the heir to a long record of effective seapower. It does not have the proud tradition of either the American or British navies. However, the Soviet Navy apparently performed in World War II in a manner that was at least creditable, although it fought no more than one major surface action. Information on its operations is extremely sparse, but there is some reason to believe that it prevented the landing of hostile forces behind the lines of the Red Army in the Baltic and Black Sea areas.¹⁸ Its mission then was essentially defensive, and like the Soviet Air Force, it was used primarily as an auxiliary to land power. The recent showing of the Red flag in the Middle East plus announcements of Red Navy maneuvers indicate that the U.S.S.R. is probably thinking of a more active role for the navy in any future conflict, and of course the development of missile-carrying subs would reinforce that conclusion.

ICBM

It would perhaps be appropriate to close with a word about missiles, inasmuch as Soviet progress in that field runs like a unifying thread throughout this discussion. The Soviet's most spectacular achievements in this field are too well known to require more than passing mention, namely the successful firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile, announced on August 26 last, and Sputniks I and II, launched at the beginning of October and November respectively. Any scepticism that may have greeted the announcement of the ICBM firing (and in military circles it should have been minimal, judging by the public testimony of many military men) was pretty well exploded by the earth satellites. If the Soviet Union has a rocket capable of putting a 184 pound ball 560 miles above the earth, and another capable of hurling a 1,120 pound object 1056

miles up,¹⁹ it should certainly be capable of firing an ICBM.

Missile Guidance

Yet what is perhaps more startling than the launching of the satellites is the fact that the Soviets have been able to put them into orbits. This achievement indicates that the Russians have gone rather a long way toward solving the incredibly complex problems of missile guidance. They also claim that their ICBM homed on the target area. This in itself means little, unless the target area was, let us say, the size of a city. However, when one considers the inaccuracies of maps, and the possibilities of a missile's deflection by the different densities of different atmospheric layers, then if the Soviets were actually able to put their missile in a small pre-set target area, their achievement is very great indeed.

In addition to its earth satellites and its presumed ICBM, the U.S.S.R. possesses a full arsenal of missile types, ground to ground, ground to air, air to ground, air to air, and types which can be fired from surface or underwater naval craft. Some of these rockets were on display on November 7, 1957. Furthermore it is possible that the Soviet Union has an intermediate range missile (1500 miles), and the Russians were reported to have fired a missile hundreds of miles "in some numbers" almost two years ago.²⁰

In conclusion, the Soviet Union has pursued a military policy well coordinated with her political aims. She has implemented that policy vigorously and has now carried it to the point where the strategic advantage may move to her side. The West must move with equal vigor. To do less is to court disaster.

¹⁷ Navy Department Press Release, January 29, 1957. *op. cit.*
¹⁸ Jurg Meister, "The Soviet Navy in World War II," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, August, 1957.

¹⁹ *Washington Post*, November 4, 1957, p. 1. *The New York Times* of November 3, 1957, states however, that the altitude of Sputnik II is 937 miles. Also, the *Post* article indicated notes that the calculations of the Naval Research Laboratory's Vanguard Computing Center put the average height of Sputnik II at 530 miles, or 160 miles higher than the average of Sputnik I.

²⁰ U. S. Senate. Committee on the Armed Services. Subcommittee on the Air Force. Hearings before the subcommittee. 84th Congress, 2nd session. Washington. U. S. Government Printing Office. 1956, p. 769.

An evaluation of Russia's industrial potential reveals that "the Kremlin's latest technological successes notwithstanding, the Soviets and the other Communist countries still have a long way to go before they approach standards of the West."

Soviet Industrial Development

BY MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

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AS THESE lines are written, two *sputniks* are circling the earth at a vertiginous speed. In a world less divided than ours, as recently perhaps as 40 years ago, the appearance of the first man-made satellite in the august company of heavenly bodies would have been met with enthusiasm and excitement untinged with threats of destruction, with trepidation and fear. In those happier days the successful launching of the first celestial wanderer devised by human ingenuity would have been acclaimed as a major triumph for science—not necessarily the science of any particular nation—and as a victory of man in his age-long struggle for the mastery of the forces of nature, irrespective of the practical implication of the new development.

In the hopelessly split world in which we live, the reaction to the successful Soviet experiment is very different, and the solution

of a complex scientific and technical problem assumes the character of a near calamity. Curiously, the most alarmist statements come not from Moscow and the Communists but from the Jeremiahs and Cassandras in the West who interpret the ascent of *sputniks* as conclusive evidence of the superiority of Soviet science and technology. How much truth is there in these allegations? A survey of Soviet industrial development may help to answer this question.

Rapid industrialization has been the avowed cardinal objective of the Soviet Union since its inception and particularly since the introduction of planned economy in October, 1928. The emphasis has been consistently on the building up of the heavy industry producing the means of production, and while the desirability of increasing the relative share of light industry producing consumer goods was at times discussed—for instance, during the short rule of Malenkov—nothing was done about it. The share of consumer goods in industrial production declined steadily from 60.5 per cent in 1928, to 46.6 per cent in 1932, 38.8 per cent in 1940, 34.1 per cent in 1946, 30.8 per cent in 1953, and 29.5 per cent in 1955.

The policy of industrialization was pursued with tenacity and ruthlessness. Some of the results are summarized in Tables I and II; the data presented in these tables, as well as the other statistics quoted in this article, are derived from official Soviet sources (see page following).

A glance at the two tables reveals the magnitude of the industrial base built by the Soviets in a record time, as well as its high cost to the people, which is indicated by the

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TABLE I
Average Annual Output and Rate of Growth of Selected Industries
by Five-Year Plans

	First Five- Year Plan (1929- 1932)	Second Five- Year Plan (1933- 1937)	3 Prewar Years of Third Five- Year Plan (1938- 1940)	Fourth Five- Year Plan (1946- 1950)	Fifth Five- Year Plan (1951- 1955)	1955
<i>Iron</i>						
Output (million tons)	5.0	11.8	14.7	14.1	27.5	33.3
Rate of growth (per cent)	17.1	18.6	1.0	16.9	11.7	11.1
<i>Steel</i>						
Output (million tons)	5.5	12.7	18.0	19.4	38.1	45.3
Rate of growth (per cent)	8.7	24.5	1.1	17.4	10.6	9.3
<i>Coal</i>						
Output (million tons)	52.2	107.0	148.5	210.4	328.3	391.3
Rate of growth (per cent)	16.0	14.7	9.1	11.8	8.4	12.7
<i>Oil</i>						
Output (million tons)	19.0	25.4	30.5	29.7	54.5	70.8
Rate of growth (per cent)	16.4	5.9	3.0	14.3	13.3	19.4
<i>Electric Power</i>						
Output (billion kwh)	9.7	26.5	43.6	68.2	135.7	170.2
Rate of growth (per cent)	28.2	21.7	10.1	16.1	13.3	13.0

relatively slow pace of development of light industry. In considering production figures one should keep in mind that the population of Russia (within her present boundaries) increased from 159.2 million in 1913 to 202.2 million in 1956, that is, by 41 million. Population growth inevitably lessens the effects of greater production measured on a per capita basis.

Soviet statistics do not inspire unbounded confidence and as often as not are a source of confusion and bewilderment rather than of enlightenment. Yet the existence in the U.S.S.R. of a vast industrial plant which is an essential element in her war potential is not open to doubt. The process of industrial expansion continues under the sixth Five-Year Plan which, however, as will be shown

TABLE II
Indexes of Industrial Production
(1913 = 100)

	1928	1932	1937	1940	1945	1950	1955
Gross industrial production	132	267	588	852	782	1,467	2,729
Producers goods	155	424	1,013	1,554	1,744	3,185	6,054
Consumers goods	120	187	373	497	295	613	1,079
Iron	78	146	344	353	209	455	790
Steel	100	140	419	433	290	646	1,070
Coal	122	221	439	570	513	897	1,344
Oil	126	232	309	337	210	410	767
Electric power	257	696	1,860	2,484	2,224	4,690	8,752
Chemical industry	146	460	1,528	2,461	2,413	4,500	10,243
Machine-building and metal-working	175	699	1,977	3,473	4,474	7,451	16,183
Cement	122	229	359	373	121	671	1,479
Cotton textiles	104	104	134	153	63	151	229
Woolen textiles	84	86	105	116	52	151	245
Leather Footwear	97	145	305	352	105	339	457

presently, is being discarded. Concentration of production, a sign of advanced industrialization, has made considerable progress. In 1932, the Soviet Union had no steel plants with an annual capacity of over 500,000 tons; in 1955, 58.5 per cent of Soviet steel came from plants with an annual capacity of over one million tons each. The industrialization of Russia is a fact and its consequences have to be faced.

The Soviets' alleged superiority over the West, particularly over the United States, is a totally different matter. No attempt will be made here to compare the rates of economic growth of the two countries. I have explained in a recent issue of *Current History* (September, 1957) why I regard such comparisons as unsound and, indeed, misleading. However, since the notion that Soviet economy is growing faster than that of the United States has gained wide acceptance, it may be well to quote again the tentative conclusions reached by Professor G. Warren Nutter, of the University of Virginia, in an excellent study prepared under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research:

Over the Soviet era as a whole the Soviet industries have generally lost historical ground to their American counterparts—the lags have generally increased—in terms of both total and per capita output. That is, the growth from the same level of output, total of per capita, has been slower in Soviet than in American industry.

This contention has not gone unchallenged, yet it should not be dismissed lightly.

The crux of the matter is that statistics, essential as they are, do not tell the whole story of economic development. An example may help to clarify this point. Tables I and II disclose a substantial increase in the output of electric current. In 1955 (1913 = 100) the index of the output of electricity stood at 8,752 and held the third place, coming after machine-building and the chemical industry. A statement to this effect may well create the impression that the electrification of Russia has been largely accomplished. However, according to the official report on the fulfillment of the fifth Five-Year Plan, "at the end of 1955 . . . only 25

per cent of the collective farms were supplied with electricity." That is, nearly 40 years after the advent of the Bolsheviks, Lenin's dictum, "Soviet power plus electrification is communism," still awaits implementation.

To put it differently, while the world watches with admiration or awe the well-ordered perigrinations of *sputnik*, about one-third of the Soviet citizens spend the long autumn evenings by the light of oil lamps—if they are fortunate enough to get oil—and since they have no electricity and therefore no radios, many of them probably did not even know for quite a while of their country's epoch-making scientific achievement.

A glimpse of Russia conveyed by an intelligent observer throws occasionally more light on the level of Soviet industrial progress and technology than rows of dreary and labored statistics. James Reston, of *The New York Times*, reporting on his 630-mile drive from Brest to Moscow in September, 1957, stated that in the three days spent on the road he encountered 33 private cars, that there were five gasoline stations—of which one did not function—between Brest and Moscow, and that "if one passes a hard road off the main highway in a hundred miles it is surprising." The odd mixture of the old and the new, of modern scientific and technical advance with medieval conditions and attitudes, was inherited by the Soviets from imperial Russia, and the cleavage was further widened by the hasty and ill-considered industrialization. Surely, the resulting situation cannot be ignored in any rational evaluation of the Soviet war potential.

Reorganization of Controls

The recent far-reaching remodelling of industrial controls would seem to confirm the view that Soviet planned economy did not work too well. Proposed by Khrushchev, the plan for the reorganization of economic administrative agencies was officially said to have been discussed, between March 30 and May 4, at 514,000 meetings attended by over 40 million people, and was enacted into law by the Supreme Soviet on May 10, 1957. The gist of the reform which, according to Khrushchev, embodies "Lenin's basic principle of democratic centralism and planned

management," was the abolition of 25 out of 32 federal economic ministries formerly in charge of industry and the transfer of their functions to 105 regional economic administrative councils. Under the new dispensation centralized control is exercised by the planning bodies which, too, have been reorganized with extended powers.

The discussion of the reform in the Supreme Soviet and elsewhere released a flood of criticism directed against the departments which had controlled industry for nearly forty years. The roster of their alleged failings included procrastination, waste, negligence, parochialism, inefficiency, low quality of production, high costs, lack of initiative, poor coordination, bureaucratism, a variety of abuses and sheer stupidity. Mr. Reston's remarks on the condition of the United States embassy building in Moscow lends color to these charges:

The plaster would not adhere to the struts in the walls. The doors do not fit the doorjambs. The elevators are a menace to human life. The steps vary in height and width and the whole edifice, as seen from inside, looks as if it had been built long before the Bolsheviks came to power. Actually it was built four and a half years ago.

Whether the regional economic administrative councils will improve the situation remains to be seen. It is certain, however, that the reform came as a rude shock to the bureaucracy and is likely to have, at least temporarily, a disorganizing effect upon production.

A startling development was the announcement (September 25, 1957) by the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers that the sixth Five-Year Plan will be put aside at the end of 1958 and will be replaced by a Seven-Year Plan covering 1959 through 1965. The official reasons given for this surprising move were the decentralization of industrial management which "necessitates radical changes" in the system of planning, the discovery of new raw materials and the formulation of a program for the development of plastics and synthetic fibers for which no provisions were made in the sixth Five-Year Plan.

This explanation is puzzling because, con-

trary to the widely accepted view, the Five-Year Plan never was a blueprint but, in Stalin's phrase, "a first approximation" subject to continuous revision. This indeed, was the practice of Soviet planning for over a quarter of a century. Revisions far more drastic than those announced on September 25 were never before deemed a justification for the abandonment of a Five-Year Plan. Five-Year Plans have long become part and parcel of the Soviet scene and, in a sense, a symbol of Soviet economy. Their disappearance and the shift to the seven-year period are highly disturbing to both the leaders of Soviet economy and the students of Soviet affairs.

Technical Skills

The efficiency of an industry depends on the size, skill and education levels of its labor force. The total number of men and women in Soviet industrial employment increased from 8 million in 1932, to 10 million in 1937, 11 million in 1940, 14 million in 1950, and 17.4 million in 1955. The number of engineers and technical personnel (included in the above figures) was 420,000 in 1932, 722,000 in 1937, 932,000 in 1940, 1.2 million in 1950, and 1.5 million in 1955.

The Kremlin is much concerned with the training of specialists. In 1951, the Soviet Union had 21,900 graduate students; of this number 5,800 (26 per cent) studied engineering and 970 (4 per cent) physics and mathematics. In 1956, the number of graduate students increased to 29,400 and included 9,400 (32 per cent) engineers, and 2,900 (10 per cent) physicists and mathematicians. On October 1, 1955, there were in the Soviet Union 223,893 scientific workers of whom 9,500 held doctoral degrees and 78,000 candidate of science degrees. The largest single group were the engineers who numbered 61,100 and accounted for 1,855 doctoral and 20,100 candidate of science degrees. Physicists and mathematicians numbered 20,100, including 855 recipients of doctoral and 5,400 of candidate of science degrees.

These are substantial figures and the increase in the number of engineers and especially of physicists and mathematicians will

be noted. Nevertheless, they do not seem unduly high for a country with a population of 200 million, one, moreover, engaged in a gigantic program of industrialization. The number of holders of doctoral degrees—under 10,000 or less than 5 per cent of the aggregate number of scientific workers—is rather small. Some 136,000 scientific workers, or 60 per cent of the total number, had no higher degrees.

There is little in these statistics to justify alarm in the West even though the Soviet mastery of the hydrogen bomb (August, 1953) and the announcement of the successful test of an intercontinental missile (August 27, 1957), followed by the launching of the two *sputniks* are sufficient evidence that the upper levels of Soviet scientists are second to none. But this should long have been known.

Soviet scientists have to face peculiar difficulties. The sensation created in the U.S.S.R. by Vladimir Dudintsev's novel, *Not By Bread Alone*, which depicts the persecution of a high-minded inventor, may be significant. Its success was not due to its literary merits, which are questionable, but to its theme, which struck a responsive chord. The West may take heart in the thought that a firmly entrenched doctrinaire bureaucracy is seldom the instrument of progress, although it cannot stifle it altogether.

Aid to Underdeveloped Countries

Higher levels of production and the rise in the number of Russian engineers and technicians provide opportunities for the expansion of economic assistance to the underdeveloped non-Communist countries. This program, which I examined in *Current History* of September, 1957, is recent; it was inaugurated in 1954 and is still conducted on a relatively modest scale although it would seem to have been stepped up of late and to have gained importance as a weapon in the struggle of communism for the elimination of the West from the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

In spite of the resounding publicity given to Soviet economic aid, factual information on its nature and size is scarce. Moscow's

latest move in that area is the agreement with Syria. Soviet aims in the Middle East were well served by the aftermath of confusion and distrust which the Suez crisis left in its wake. A Syrian mission headed by Khaled el Azem, Minister of Defense, visited Moscow from July 24 to August 7, 1957, and negotiated a comprehensive economic agreement which was to be followed by a supplementary agreement "on specific questions of Soviet-Syrian economic cooperation."

In the Moscow agreement (August 6), the Soviet government undertook to cooperate with the Syrians in the execution of several major development projects which were to be financed by Soviet loans, and promised to buy a substantial portion of Syria's surplus agricultural produce. The development program was said to comprise a railway between Latakia, a port on the Mediterranean through which Soviet arms deliveries reach Syria, and the hinterland; a railway between Damascus and Homs; a dam on the Euphrates; reclamation and irrigation works; road and bridge construction and power plants. These projects are identical with those studied and recommended in 1955 by a mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It was announced early in October that Moscow has guaranteed the purchase of all Syria's surplus agricultural produce. Half of the price is payable in hard currency and the balance in machinery and other commodities.

Meanwhile a Soviet team of 17 technical experts toured Syria and on October 28 signed in Damascus a supplementary agreement which added to the list of the projects mentioned above a fertilizer plant, the preparation of a geological map, and geological explorations, including search for oil. Moscow will supply Syria with the equipment, machinery, materials and experts needed for the execution of the program and will provide "the necessary appropriations" at the annual interest rate of 2.5 per cent, repayable over a period of 12 years. The amount of Soviet aid was not given in the official text.

An accompanying statement put the agreed Soviet "investments" in Syria at \$100 million. Other well-informed sources estimated the Soviet "loan" at \$400 million or

even \$500 million. Whether "investments" and "loan" refer to the same transactions remains uncertain, but it is believed that the Syrian agreement is by far the most ambitious foreign aid program embarked upon thus far by the Kremlin.

The official object of the agreement is "to strengthen Syrian political and economic independence and to overcome the effects of colonialism." The Soviet delegation stated in August that "economic cooperation will be effected without any political or other stipulations, on the basis of equality and mutual economic advantage, non-interference in domestic affairs, and complete respect for the national dignity and sovereignty of the Republic of Syria." A similar assurance was given in the communiqué of October 28.

Events in Syria tell a different story. The Syrian Chief of Staff, General Taufiq Nizam ed-Din, a landowner of conservative leanings and a member of the delegation to Moscow, resigned his army position during the negotiations and was succeeded by Colonel (now General) Afif Bizri, an officer of Left-wing affiliations. Several other senior officers were retired or arrested and were replaced by the political friends of the new chief of staff. Then came the discovery of an alleged Right-wing conspiracy involving the United States embassy, followed by charges made by Damascus and Moscow that Turkey, on the instigation of the United States, was planning to invade Syria. The world and the United Nations were faced with another major crisis in the Middle East. Clearly it was not unrelated to Soviet economic aid to Syria, which was presumably the consequence of the oil riches of the Middle East and their importance to the West.*

Reports are circulated that the Soviets are multiplying offers of economic assistance to Indonesia where President Sukarno, beset by mountainous domestic difficulties, appears to be drifting into the Communist

orbit. If these speculations are correct, it is likely that the acceptance of Soviet aid by Indonesia will result in a situation similar to the one that developed in Syria, for the ultimate aim of Soviet economic aid—the elimination of the influence of the West—is immutable.

Sputnik

Illogically, Soviet machinations in Syria and elsewhere were greatly helped by the two *sputniks*. By a quaint and even perverse process of reasoning innumerable people in the United States and throughout the world came to the startling conclusion that since the Soviets were first in launching the satellites, they could do anything. This pernicious and ridiculous belief stems from three basic misconceptions: Russians are incapable of independent work in the field of advanced technology; science cannot progress under a dictatorial regime; and the launching of *sputniks* has undermined, if not destroyed, this country's capacity for defense. None of these contentions hold water.

There is no reason to deny the Russians the ability to do high grade work in engineering, physics, mathematics or electronics. The great weakness of Russia was, and is, that technical knowledge is spread thin and is within the reach of a relatively small group of people, but there was no question in the last hundred years that Russian scientists held an honorable place among their colleagues from other nations. In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, and especially since the revolution of 1917, many Russian scholars have filled with distinction important positions in the leading institutions of learning throughout the world.

The Russian-born and Russian-trained engineers, inventors and aeroplane designers I. Sikorsky and A. L. de Seversky have made major contributions to the advancement of American aviation and need no introduction to the American public. Why should it be surprising that Russian engineers should be somewhat ahead of their American and western-European colleagues in solving the intricate problem of launching a satellite which is part of the program of the International Geophysical Year?

* Another manifestation of this policy is the offer of a loan of 700 million rubles (nominally \$175 million) made by the Kremlin to Major General Abdel Hakim, Egyptian War Minister, during his visit to Moscow in November, 1957. The terms of the loan are, broadly speaking, similar to those of the Syrian agreement. It was announced in Cairo that the Soviet proposal was accepted 'in principle' and that an Egyptian delegation headed by Aziz Sidky, Minister of Industry, was leaving for Moscow to work out the details of the Soviet aid.

It is true that the social sciences, literature and the arts are severely handicapped under a totalitarian regime, but the case of science is different. It is indeed arguable that a dictator may find it easier to obtain the means for expensive technological experiments than the leader of a representative government dependent on the appropriations of a tax- and election-conscious parliament. President Eisenhower has stated that in 1945 the Russians captured all German scientists in Peenemunde, Hitler's "great laboratory and experimental ground for the production of ballistic missiles." It is known that German scientists, trained under National Socialism, hold some of the leading positions in the appropriate defense departments in the United States and Great Britain. So much about the alleged inability of a dictatorial regime to advance technology.

Finally, the contention that launching the *sputniks* has imperilled the defense of this country and of the West is unwarranted. The potentialities of *sputniks*—and their Western cousins who, no doubt, will follow them into celestial regions—are intriguing, exciting and potentially great, but no one at this time would seem to know exactly what they are. The President said the first satellite "does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota. I see nothing at this moment, at this stage of development, that is signifi-

cant in that development as far as our security is concerned." Mr. Eisenhower added that the launching "does definitely prove the possession by these Russian scientists of a very powerful thrust in their rocketry"; however, there was no ground to question this after the Soviet announcement of successful experiments with an intercontinental missile.

A Warning

The above observations should not be interpreted as an invitation to complacency. The figures of Tables I and II, imperfect as they are, tell the story of Soviet industrial advance better than the spectacular, albeit difficult to observe, orbits of the *sputniks*. The Kremlin's latest technological successes notwithstanding, the Soviets and the other Communist countries still have a long way to go before they approach the standards of the West. So long as the free world keeps its house in order and remains reasonably united and watchful, it has no reason for fear, although the danger remains. Commenting on the recent maneuvers of the NATO fleet, the Earl of Selkirk, First Lord of the Admiralty, stated that in case of a war with the Soviet Union, "I should not like to say that we would have an easy task." This is a fair appraisal of the outlook if efforts to preserve peace fail.



"... Religion and law will remain distant from each other, distrustful, and alienated until men reach the point of knowing, as thoroughly as they know their own physical existence, that both creation and revelation in the cosmos and in the law are incomplete, ongoing, and continuous. Deprived as they are of the light of this knowledge, law and religion stand rigidly apart, and the gulf between them grows ominously wider. Because of it, religion in America is approaching and soon must confront a great and unnoticed crisis.

"At least in America and probably in most other parts of the Western world, religion has been entering this unnoticed crisis, which appears to increase rapidly in scope and intensity. What is it that marks the crisis? *The fact that for the first time in the general course of Western history since the advent of Christianity, law often equals and occasionally surpasses religion in the quality of its announced faith and practical works.* . . .

"... In a democratic society like ours, law is tethered to the opinions and moral standards of the general public, and if religion fails to lead and edify these, the advancement of law will inevitably suffer."

—Edmond Cahn, Professor of Law, New York University,
Religion and Law, November 17, 1957.

"A fundamental shift is indeed in progress just now from collective to state farming (svokhozy)." Will the peasants consent? This specialist believes that the Soviet peasants "may actually be happy to get rid of the blessing of 'collective ownership,' Soviet type, and become wage earners—the prospect which horrified them 30 years ago."

Soviet Agriculture

BY NAUM JASNY

Soviet Economic Study Group

SOVIET farming shows a substantial improvement since Stalin's death. -In the three years, 1953-1956, farm output seems to have been enlarged by about 25-30 per cent. Rates of growth even approaching this in magnitude are not observed in agriculture in other countries, except in periods of recovery from previous strong declines. Soviet Russia is not an exception.

The depth to which Soviet agriculture was forced in the last years of the "genius" is difficult to realize fully. Every bit of additionally released evidence shows this depth more clearly.

Farm output only just about regained the 1940 level by 1953 (postwar boundaries also for 1940). The increase in the quarter of a century since 1928 was equivalent to only 15-20 per cent. The population grew by about the same percentage but the urban population, with its much greater per capita consumption of farm products (in value terms) than the rural population, increased 2.5 fold during the period. The utilization of farm products for purposes other than private consumption was expanded greatly. All in all, per capita consumption of farm products by the rural and the urban population was in 1953 much smaller than in 1928,

when it was certainly on the moderate side (the peasants were almost vegetarians). Specifically, during the last years of Stalin's reign, farm output nearly stagnated with more or less dangerous declines here and there. There was a catastrophe with flax as well as with grain and some other crops in the Northwest.

In those years, say 1950-1952, the masses of kolkhoz peasants were near starvation. Those who could run away did so. Most of the rest were unwilling to work for their kolkhozy and in any case worked only badly.

Those post-Stalin rulers who, unlike Molotov and company, are not prevented from speaking, pretend that they had nothing to do with the near-catastrophe to which 36 years of their Party rule and of their personal activities (especially those of Khrushchev himself) brought the country.

What has happened with reference to farm output since Stalin's death is a more or less complete break with certain policies. The break involved such factors as supplies of labor, machinery and fertilizer to agriculture and, last but not least, incomes of the peasants. It cannot, however, be over-emphasized that no break occurred with reference to farm organization. In important

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Author's Note: So far as the present paper contains estimates of the writer, they are clearly marked or in any case recognizable. Otherwise, the evidence is either strictly official or as good as official, being taken from such sources as *Communist*, the principal Party journal, *Planned Economy*, the journal of the Gosplan, (State Planning Committee), or *Questions of Economics*, the journal of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. The official evidence is, so far as possible, from the recently released statistical handbooks, especially *The Economy of the USSR in 1956*, Moscow, 1957, and *Courier of Statistics*, the journal of the Central Statistical Administration. But an attempt to document all assertions would burst the allowed size of the paper.

points the reverse has been true. The emphasis has been fully on "socialized" agriculture. The private enterprises of the kolkhoz peasants were not encouraged. Ultimately, an attack was waged even on the output of animal products by the wage earners. Last but not least, party control over the farm organization was brought to dimensions not reached even in the days of Stalin.

Production Factors

General. Far the most important factor in the great rise in farm output since 1953 was the fact that the simple principle had been finally given recognition, or at least partial recognition, that producers must be paid for their products. The prices now paid to farm producers are badly tangled among one another. The various farm products can indeed be divided into most profitable (flax, hemp, sunflower seed), profitable (cotton and some other technical crops, potatoes), ordinary, and unprofitable (cattle, in many areas also grain). Also, farms favored by good leadership and good weather are paid much higher prices than farms that are in poor condition. But there was an overall increase in payments to collective farms for the delivered products and this brought about results which possibly were not expected by those in power.

There is no need to discuss the prices of individual farm products (in some cases the new price is tenfold and more than before 1953). The price rises are clearly revealed by the increase in money incomes of the collective farms from 42.8 billion rubles in 1952 to 94.5 billion rubles in 1956, although part of the increase was caused by the rise in volume of sales to the State.

The increased money incomes of the collective farms permitted an even greater increase in the distributions of these farms to their "members." These rose by 94 per cent between 1952 and 1955 and were measurably more than double the 1952 level in 1956. An increase in total real income per working kolkhoznik of 41 per cent from 1952 to 1956 is claimed, and, while the estimate is likely to be moderately exaggerated, the rise in their income was probably sufficient to in-

duce a more or less considerable number of kolkhozniki to become interested in the work for their kolkhozy or at least to be much less dissatisfied with the reward they are receiving for their work. It would, however, be an error to go too far in assigning significance to the change in the attitude of the peasants toward their kolkhozy.

The considerably greater attention to agriculture was reflected furthermore in a great increase in investment in agriculture. Fixed investment of the State was enlarged by about 65 per cent at constant prices in 1952-1956. A more than doubling of the investment of the kolkhozy themselves at constant prices is claimed for the same years. But undoings of decades could not have been repaired in three years. For example, for about 20 years, the Soviets were building large caterpillar tractors almost exclusively and correspondingly large working machinery, first of all huge combined grain harvesters. Although the supply of machines other than the favorites was expanding more or less rapidly after 1952, at the end of 1956, the U.S.S.R. still had only 271,000 such row-crop tractors, of which millions are needed. Much cultivating and other work in row crops and also harvesting of the crops including hay mowing were done by hand in this year.

Output of commercial fertilizer increased by 67 per cent from 1952 to 1956, remaining however, greatly inadequate, especially in view of the smallness of the livestock herds. The manure of the vanishing horses certainly was not replaced fully by mineral fertilizer in the territories where it is particularly important.

A factor stimulating growth in farm output was, finally, a decided change in the attitude toward providing agriculture with labor. Almost to the end of Stalin's reign, labor was drawn from the farm for non-farm employment with complete disregard of the needs of agriculture. No adequate attention was given to the problems of raising labor productivity in the non-farm activities either. Targets for farm labor were normally underfulfilled by great margins, while the targets for the labor force in non-farm occupations were exceeded by large numbers.

The shift away from this pernicious policy toward farm labor, although it started under Stalin, did not gain momentum until later. While the number of workers in farming (kolkhozniki and hired labor) had been declining in Stalin's last years, it was on the increase in the most recent years.¹

The new-land and corn campaigns. Great stress among the factors leading to the enlargement of farm production in recent years is laid on the cultivation of great stretches of virgin and long-fallow land and to the large expansion of corn production. The corn is grown in old agricultural areas, and as far as it gives some results, it is part of the general improvement of these areas. On the other hand, the bigger the success of the new-land venture, the less is the share of the older territories in the total increase in farm output in the last three years. This applies particularly to 1956, when the new lands produced a bumper crop.

No less than 35.9 million hectares of new land was taken into cultivation in 1954-1956. Most of this land is located in southeastern European Russia and especially in West Siberia and Kazakhstan. The latter alone accounts for 20 million hectares of new land. Most of this land is in areas with precipitation only recently believed to have been below the minimum needed for profitable cultivation (this minimum lies at 12 inches of annual precipitation; in North America the accepted minimum is somewhat higher). Large stretches of the new land are also excessively saline. An important negative factor is considerable wind erosion.

The new-land enterprise is a problematic proposition in the long run. A substantial portion of these lands will have to be returned to grass in the not too distant future, and the average yield from the remaining area is likely to be low, probably only about 4 quintals per hectare net of seed: 1 quintal per hectare is equal to about 1.5 bushels of 60 pounds per acre. For the next few years, however, the land will still have the large fertility accumulated when it was in grass. With over-average precipitation like that in 1956 the land will produce

lavishly. But will be of considerable help even in the years of average rainfall.

In 1954, Khrushchev explained the new venture by the fact that "we can not wait" until farm production expands in the older territories. In 1955, when the crops in the new lands failed, he said nothing at all. In 1956, the new-land campaign was proclaimed the greatest event in world history. Khrushchev's history does not extend far in either direction.

Khrushchev, the expert in agriculture, as he calls himself, made the discovery that corn can be grown everywhere in the U.S.S.R. and even further north (Finland). It is recognized however that corn can not mature everywhere in the U.S.S.R. and that in the more northern and even in central areas it must be grown for green fodder or silage. Originally Khrushchev advocated with great cocksureness separate silaging of the cobs (as feed for hogs) and of the stalks (as feed for cows), but the practice did not establish itself.

The corn acreage was expanded from 3.5 million in 1953 (this was a many-year minimum) to 23.9 million in 1956. While all of the 3.5 million hectares grown in 1953 were for mature corn, only 9.3 million hectares were so grown in 1956; of the 14.6 million hectares of corn grown for green fodder and silage in 1956, less than half were for silage. Acreage for green fodder included a substantial acreage lost completely (this is recognized in Soviet pronouncements).

One of the most important "victories" on the farm front in recent years was the great increase in the yield of milk per cow in the kolkhozy (by almost 60 per cent in 1953-1956). There seems to be no doubt that the expansion of the corn acreage and specifically the failure of Khrushchev's plan of separate silaging of the cobs and stalks were largely responsible for this increase in milk output.

They are silent in the U.S.S.R. about the price paid for the gains resulting from the two discussed campaigns. The transfer of machinery and manpower to the new-land areas certainly affected adversely the production of the old territories. In 1955, the whole net returns from the new land may have been insufficient to cover those losses.

¹ The phenomenon, it is true, was much influenced by the great changes in the net access of labor in the U.S.S.R. as a whole, which happened in the very same years.

The great expansion of corn-growing certainly interferes with timely planting of winter wheat in the south, with harvesting of potatoes in the central sector and the north, and so forth. The corn is partly grown on land which otherwise would have been in fallow. So there is a loss in other crops.

Whatever gains were made from the new land and corn campaigns, fewer of them would have resulted if the principal factors stimulating growth in farm output, and especially the much better prices paid for farm products to producers, were absent.

Organization

One of the leading ideas of Stalin's policies in the village (and outside of it) was "*samotek* [natural flow] will not be suffered." And the idea is also one of the leading ones with the post-Stalin rulers and especially Mr. Khrushchev himself. Where in organizational policies modifications from Stalin can be observed, they can be correctly considered improvements of the line taken by Stalin. The following individual items have to be considered here:

- a. Party control; M.T.S. control;
- b. The kolkhozniki are to exert their initiative;
- c. Distributions to kolkhozniki in money rather than in kind; kolkhoz markets; product exchange;
- d. Decentralized planning.

Control. The very first decision of the Party on agriculture after Stalin's death, the decision of the plenary meeting of the C.C. of the Party of September 7, 1953, proclaimed "it would be an error to think that the further rise in agriculture will go by *samotek*." Correspondingly, for each M.T.S. (machine-tractor station) with its group of kolkhozy there were to be organized groups of workers in the district Party committee, headed by a special secretary—to direct and control the M.T.S. and each kolkhoz. The same measure was discussed—with great emphasis—also in the decision of the plenary meeting of the Party of March 24, 1954.

While the district Party organization was given great power in organizing and con-

trolling the work of the M.T.S. and the kolkhozy, the M.T.S. also were endowed with far-reaching control power over the same kolkhozy. They were to participate in working out the operational plans of their kolkhozy and were made responsible for the fulfillment of the delivery obligations of the kolkhozy toward the State.

To provide for the needed personnel in the district Party organizations and otherwise, a mass of workers (all or most of them Party members) was sent from the cities to the rural areas. Khrushchev suggested 50,000 of such emissaries; over 20,000 seemed actually to have gone.

The kolkhozniki are exerting their initiative. The great recovery of agriculture from the devastations of the full-scale collectivization in the early 1930's was largely attained, especially with reference to potatoes, vegetables and animal products, by the private farming enterprises of the kolkhozniki. In contrast to this, the post-Stalin recovery was to be based on socialized farming.

Suppression of the private economy of the kolkhozniki actually started as early as 1938, i.e., as soon as the recovery from the low of the starvation years 1932 and 1933 had been completed. The suppression was not fully discontinued even during World War II and was renewed after its end. The production of the kolkhozniki indeed never regained the pre-war level until Stalin's death, and possibly still remains below the pre-war level.

The attitude of the Party to the private economy of the kolkhozniki at the present time was revealed with great clarity in the decree "On the Statute of the Agricultural Artel and the Further Development of the Initiative of the Kolkhozniki in the Organization of the Kolkhoz Output and the Management of the Business of the Artel," published in the papers of March 10, 1956. The cynicism of speaking of the initiative of the kolkhozniki, after incessantly stressing the control of the Party and of the M.T.S., after having declared *samotek* anathema! The cynicism is particularly great because the order spoke of *further* development of the initiative of the kolkhozniki, as if they ever had been permitted to exert the smallest initiative in anything.

In the document, the kolkhozniki were invited to exert their initiative in changing the minimum number of days they have to work for their kolkhoz and the size of the lot and of the number of livestock they are permitted to hold or to own. The change of course could consist only in an *increase* of the number of days worked and in a *cut* of the plots held by them and of the numbers of animals permitted to them. The Minister of Finance was careful to reduce in the 1957 budget the expected return from the agricultural tax "in connection with the change in the size of the kolkhozniki's plots [another cynicism] in accordance with the decisions of the plenary meetings of the kolkhozy."²

Efforts to reduce the private economy of the kolkhozniki is explained by the expansion of the economy of the kolkhozy and the growing distributions of the kolkhozy to the kolkhozniki. But aside from the fact that a very great number of kolkhozy still distribute only little to their kolkhozniki, even the kolkhozniki of the more prosperous kolkhozy need their private economy as insurance against poor crops in their kolkhozy, which, as was already explained, hit the kolkhozniki with particular force in view of the extremely unfair system of payments by the State for the deliveries of the kolkhozy.

By the decree of July 4, 1957, the obligatory deliveries of the kolkhozniki and wage earners, which had been curtailed in 1953, were abolished entirely. The measure was largely a bribe in connection with the dethroning of Molotov and company. It will strengthen the interest of the Party in reduction and final abolition of the private economy of the kolkhozniki.

Product exchange and kolkhoz markets. The last great act of the "genius" was his pamphlet, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (Bolshevik, September, 1952). In this a measure was advocated which Stalin called product exchange, declared an important step to communism. The collective farms, rather than selling their produce in kolkhoz markets, were to deliver their produce to the State in exchange for consumers' goods, which were

then to be distributed by the kolkhozy to the kolkhozniki in an undisclosed manner.

Nothing has been heard of this clumsy institution since Stalin's death but the same aim of reducing the turnover in kolkhoz markets is being reached in a much more effective manner, by other measures. The share of the kolkhoz markets in total retail turnover was indeed cut to about one-half in recent years.

Effective in this respect were the so-called purchases of the State from the producers (purchases as opposed to obligatory deliveries) at prices which make sales in kolkhoz markets less attractive. A second measure of this type is furthermore the sale of the produce of the kolkhozy (and kolkhozniki) by the Tsentrosoyus on a commission basis. In 1953 only 70 million rubles worth were so sold, but in 1956 the sales reached 7 billion rubles, or about one seventh of the sales in kolkhoz markets.

So far as the kolkhozniki are concerned, their appearance in kolkhoz markets as sellers was likewise attacked and indeed from two ends. One end was already discussed—the curtailment, stabilization or at least only slow expansion of output of farm products by the kolkhozniki in their private farming enterprises. The other end was the discouragement of large distributions of the kolkhozy to their kolkhozniki *in kind*. Such distributions are not to exceed the personal needs of the kolkhozniki. The kolkhozy are to sell correspondingly more to the State and raise the distributions to the "members" in money. That this policy is very effective is obvious from the fact that the money distributions of the kolkhozy to the kolkhozniki more than doubled in 1952-1956 (the purchasing power of the distributed money increased even more in terms of prices charged in official trade). Yet the total real income of the peasants did not increase by more than 41 per cent even according to official calculations.

Decentralization of planning. Much propaganda is made of the decentralization of planning in agriculture (decree published in *Pravda* of May 21, 1955). Actually only the unnecessary, burdensome abuses were removed. What was believed important from the point of view of the State is fully pre-

² *Planned Economy*, 1957, No. 3, p. 28.

served. Indeed, with the increased direct control of the Party over the kolkhozy, centralization of planning in a sense is stronger now than ever before.

The Soviets are only interested in what they are to get from the kolkhozy. Correspondingly the obligatory deliveries and the so-called purchases by the State are planned centrally in the usual way. But the deliveries and sales of technical crops are equal or are actually very close to their total output. With reference to the remaining products, the procurements and purchases of the State constitute such a large proportion of the total kolkhoz output that the whole plan of production is widely predetermined by the prescribed deliveries and sales to the State. To the local authorities, in the last place to the kolkhozy themselves, are left such unimportant decisions as whether to grow barley or oats, what kind of operations to perform, and when, and so forth.

But even this is not enough. The expansion of the corn acreage from 3.5 million hectares in 1953 to 23.9 million in 1956 did not occur because of voluntary decisions of the kolkhozy. The Party through its apparatus, which is extending to each kolkhoz, played a decisive role here. The full command of the Party was further revealed in the manner by which Khrushchev's plan to overtake the United States in per capita meat and milk production in 1960-1961 (meat) and 1958 (milk) was whipped through.

The absurdity of Khrushchev's plan was discussed by this writer repeatedly.⁸ Yet two days after the "plan" was announced in the papers of May 24, 1957, a veritable deluge of plans of oblasts, districts and individual collective and State farms started to come up, according to which the target will be reached and exceeded in the required time and even earlier.

The decree on "Change of the Practice of Planning in Agriculture" published in

⁸ See, for example, N.J., *The Soviet 1956 Statistical Handbook—A Commentary*, Michigan State University Press, 1957, pp. 99-102. The target for meat is impossible to reach. Furthermore, there would not be a demand for so much meat at prices acceptable to producers, in case the impossible target would be reached. It may take much longer to reach the target for milk than the one year of Khrushchev's dream.

⁹ *Trudoden* is a unit of payment of the kolkhozniki. It is on the average equivalent to about two-thirds of a work-day.

papers of May 21, 1955, cites abuses of central planning that should have never occurred. Now the incomparably more ignorant secretaries of the district Party organizations and their subordinates speak the decisive word. Nothing good can be expected from this.

Conclusion

About half the increase in farm output in 1953-1956 was attained by the new-land program. An increase of say 15 per cent in the older territories may be all right for a three-year period, but it cannot make up for 36 years of mismanagement. It implies that in large areas and with reference to many products the situation was substantially the same in 1956 as in the last years of Stalin's reign, that even the worst results of the devastation of agriculture since the full-scale collectivization in 1929-1930 were by no means fully eliminated. Evidence is ample: The most terrific is the information contained in an "Address of the Party and Government to Farm Producers" of January 17, 1957:

Low yields of grain, not exceeding 3-4 quintals per hectare, which during several years have been obtained by many collective and State farms in Novgorod, Pskov, Kostroma, Velikoluki and some other oblasts of the RSFSR, in White Russia and the Baltic area, are in the first place the result

Even raising the yield stated to say 6 quintals per hectare to arrive at the average yields in the territories involved, a yield seems to be indicated which in some of the enumerated territories may have prevailed 100, or more, years ago.

Operating with averages for such huge countries as the U.S.S.R. is not very conducive anyway. Such practice easily misleads one under the specific conditions of Soviet collectivized farming. There is no doubt that many kolkhozy even in 1957 distributed per *trudoden*⁹ a pound of grain and the equivalent of the price of a pound or two of the coarsest bread in money, i.e., on which the person working could not live.

Evidence on retail sales in rural areas, supported by data on money incomes of the

farm population, indicate small total purchases of consumers' goods by this population, indeed only about one-quarter of those of the residual population on a per capita basis. And only a few, including the constructors of the *Sputniks*, live well in the U.S.S.R. Stratification is great even in the farm population. The rank-and-file peasant is in really deplorable shape.

Not hoping to remedy these evils, the Soviets started to give up on the collective system. A fundamental shift is indeed in progress just now from collective to State farming (sovkhozy). Their participation in the new-land venture on a large scale is natural; this very hazardous enterprise is much more suitable for the big State than for groups of settlers. But the operation of State farms also is expanding greatly at the expense of land of liquidated kolkhozy in the non-blacksoil area. This is the very area with the amazingly low yield of grain deplored in the Address. This is the area particularly harmed by the collectivization. The mechanization which accompanied collectivization was to be effected in these areas without providing suitable machinery. No fertilizer was forthcoming to replace fully manure once supplied by the horse. Add to this all the "direction" and "control," the kolkhoz chairmen "recommended" by the Party, and so forth, and the reasons for the plight of these areas are clear. *Post factum*, in 1957, it was disclosed that the transfer to sovkhozy started in 1954, i.e., before they had been given a chance to recover. The very latest evidence makes it likely that

conversion of kolkhozy into sovkhozy and the transfer of kolkhoz land to the latter is in progress in all parts of the U.S.S.R.

Benediktov, then Minister of Agriculture, said in 1956 that the conversion of kolkhozy into State farms has to occur with consent of the peasants. And possibly the consent is real in this case. The Soviet peasants, who like peasants the world over have shown a tremendous attachment toward their private enterprises, may actually be happy to get rid of the blessing of "collective ownership," Soviet type, and become wage earners—the prospect which horrified them 30 years ago.

It is particularly significant that the Baltic states seem to be involved on a large scale in the liquidation of kolkhozy and the substitution for them of sovkhozy. These are the areas only recently blessed with collectivization (mainly since 1949). They are also in the vicinity of Poland and Hungary and the treatment of the kolkhozy in the latter country in the fall of 1956 (they were almost wiped out overnight) is unlikely not to have affected the peasants in the adjacent Soviet territories.

The shift to State farms now in progress may be the beginning of the end of the kolkhoz system.

It is a pity that space prevents saying something specifically of the great agricultural leader. The imprint of this unrestrained bully is all over everything that happened in Soviet agriculture since Stalin's death, and for several years prior to this event, and this does not promise much good.



"The Kremlin has offered us a direct challenge. It proclaims to the world that a slave economy can outproduce a free economy. It promises to the developing areas of the world that the Communist system can do more for them in a shorter time than the system of private enterprise which is the economic basis of the free world. And the spectacular success of the satellite project is being held up as proof of the superiority of the Communist system.

"... We believe that free men in the long run will outplan and outproduce a slave economy. But we cannot ignore the fact that a dictator state ... can in the short run achieve spectacular results by concentrating its full power in any given direction. That is why the challenge we face in the economic field is one which it would be folly to underestimate."

—Richard M. Nixon, Vice-President of the United States, The Soviet Challenge, Slave Economy versus Free Economy, October 15, 1957

In the Soviet Union, there is an official ideology and an unofficial, undercover one. "Since Stalin's death, the official ideology has been almost petrified, partly because there is nobody to unfold it. One may, therefore, assert the existence of a kind of uneasy equilibrium between the two ideologies."

Soviet Ideologies, 1958

BY N. S. TIMASHEFF

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IN A free society ideology is reflected in public opinion, or the sum total of answers to current problems, while ideology itself treats the problems rather in long range perspective. In free society, the policies of the government are strongly affected by public opinion and, in the final account, by dominant ideologies.

Everything is different in a totalitarian police state like the Soviet Union. Totalitarianism means government monopoly, embracing ideology and making public opinion impossible. Admittedly, there should be only one ideology, officially formulated and enforced by the government and supposedly shared by everyone. In actuality, there may be a good deal of ideological non-conformity; but it is always repressed, more or less strictly. If and when there is some relaxation, the unofficial ideology, or ideologies, pierce the crust of official conformity. But knowledge of the amount and content of non-conformity by necessity remains inadequate.

It is not too difficult to establish change in the official ideology of a totalitarian state, in our case, the Soviet Union. But

change in unofficial ideology is harder to grasp, because the differences appearing between two states of that ideology separated by some time interval may mean not so much real change as change in the intensity of the repression of non-conformity.

In the Soviet Union, the official ideology is of paramount importance since the Union is an "ideocracy," a nation supposedly governed not by men, but by a system of fixed ideas, just as, in democracy, there is the rule of law, not of men. Lenin governed Russia (the term "Soviet Union" was not yet adopted) in the name of Marxism, as interpreted by him. Out of the two major interpretations, the evolutionary-democratic (accepted by Western Socialists and the Russian Mensheviks) and the revolutionary-dictatorial, he chose the latter and allowed himself to disagree with the Great Master just in one point. Toward the end of his life, Marx admitted the possibility that in certain countries, such as the United States and England, the workers might secure their ends, i.e., create a Communist society, by peaceful means. Lenin explicitly denied this possibility and asserted that without violent revolution there was no salvation.

After his accession to power, Stalin started ruling in the name of Marxism-Leninism. Later on, this was expanded into Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism since, under Stalin, certain changes in ideology took place, some explicit, some implicit. The major change was the abandonment of the impersonal theory of social evolution typical of classical Marxism and the emergence of the "great men" theory.

Thus, in the *Outline of the History of the Communist Party*, edited or perhaps at least

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partly written by Stalin himself, the idea was expressed that the Socialist doctrine had been produced not by the labor class (as was taught during the first 20 years after the Communist Revolution) but by providential leaders. The same was true of major decision, such as the building up of socialism in one country and the collectivization of agriculture. The providential leaders were obviously Lenin and Stalin; and where the former erred, the latter supplied the right answer. This was true of the doctrine of the withering away of the state which was endorsed by Lenin but became anathema under Stalin after 1936.

The Stalin Cult

Around that change in official ideology, the Stalin cult could be built. It became part of that ideology that Stalin was great not only as a political leader (he was sometimes called "generalissimo of humanity"), but also as a man of science (of all sciences) and as an infallible judge of the value of the works of art, music and literature. The attributes ascribed to the Great Leader resembled very much those predicated of God in the Russian Catechism.

In 1950, Stalin, writing on linguistics, made a substantial change in official ideology. According to the common interpretation of the Marxian doctrine, the social process evolves by means of class struggle. But what happens when social classes are abolished (since the 1930's, they were asserted to have disappeared in the Soviet Union)? Must then the new society become petrified?

Of course not, wrote Stalin. In place of class struggle, in Communist society the social process is promoted by the wisdom of the Communist Party of which Stalin was the undisputed head. This was a change forecast by Engels in his often quoted but somewhat mysterious statement that the Communist revolution meant a jump for mankind from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom. The realm of freedom was now identified with Stalin's decisions. Stalin's formula offered the advantage of discarding a now embarrassing slogan, that of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The

new state was led not by the proletariat (which no longer exists) but by the Communist Party allegedly representing the most enlightened elements of the new society.

Other changes in official ideology were partly performed, partly planned. Quite drastic was the shift from internationalism to Russian nationalism glorifying the Russian nation as the one that deserved the position of world leadership because it had shown mankind the way to socialism. The new trend was soon given a rather ridiculous expression, e.g., it was said that all the great technical inventions were made by the Russians and then stolen by bourgeois scientists and businessmen. The idea of terminating the difference between the city and the country was almost incorporated into the official ideology. In 1951, Khrushchev announced the plan of resettling the peasants in "agrarian towns," with a far-reaching change in the system of land tenure. But almost immediately the plan was officially repudiated (although it never could have been published without Stalin's blessing). This was one of the rare cases when the Great Leader had to retreat, probably before unanimous remonstrations of his principal lieutenants (who did not include Khrushchev). But in October, 1952, five months before his death, Stalin repeated the plan in his programmatic report to the Nineteenth Party Congress.

When Stalin died, the cult of personality could not be transferred from him to anyone else since, for reasons not to be discussed here, the One Man Leadership had to be replaced by collective leadership. It seems that at first the new collective leaders feared that the masses would become restive because they had lost a tangible point of orientation of their loyalty. Very soon they learned that the Stalin cult had been a myth. Everybody had to repeat the sacramental words, but nobody believed in them, except a few young intellectuals in Georgia for whom the dominance of Stalin over Russia appeared as a kind of revenge for the absorption of Georgia by Russia 150 years earlier.

The new leaders tried first to bring to the fore the image of Lenin, somewhat

obfuscated during the last few years of Stalin's reign; but, it seems, the response to that invitation was poor. So, willy-nilly, the fact of collective leadership had to become one of the items of the official ideology. The new rulers tried to convince the people that this meant going back to Lenin's good old days. Again, they failed to persuade the addressees because too many knew that under Lenin the One Man Leadership (but not the cult of personality) had been, as real as under Stalin.

Collective Leadership

The dogma that leadership must be collective is intentionally vague; it can be interpreted as vindicating the supremacy of the Presidium, of the Central Committee, or of the party as a body. Stalin's dogma about the role of the party in Communist society seems to be firmly incorporated in the readjusted ideology. It is noteworthy that, in the indictment against Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich which preceded their elimination from positions of leadership, it was emphasized that they planned to transfer supremacy from the party to the state, i.e., the so-called Soviet government.

Relative to Malenkov, this could have been true since, a few days after Stalin's death, he agreed to cede the position of the First Secretary of the Party to Khrushchev, retaining the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers; at that time, he obviously did not intend to step down in favor of Khrushchev. If this is true, then the victory of Malenkov & Company in 1957 would have meant a significant change in the official ideology.

This victory did not materialize, and Khrushchev made a decisive step toward becoming the One Man Leader of Communist society. But no symptom of revival of the cult of personality in his favor has yet appeared. He speaks more and more authoritatively, but what he says is, with rare exceptions, the reaffirmation of the official ideology as modified by Stalin's death. It must be, however, remembered that several years passed between Stalin's real accession to power and the emergence of the cult of his personality.

The dogma of the inevitability of the world revolution, one of the cornerstones of Marxism, has persisted through all the phases of the development of the official ideology. In one regard Khrushchev has permitted himself to drop his allegiance to Lenin and go back to Marx: like the latter, he has acknowledged the possibility that the world could be made Communist by peaceful means. Communism, he has asserted, may conquer the world by displaying better and always improving achievements. Deeds seem to show that this is more a phrase than a sincere belief: if communism can and will win in the competitive manner, some progress on the path of disarmament would be observable; but there is none. So, after all, there is no change in ideology.

Nationalism has not been dropped from the official ideology, but, since Stalin's death, it has been curbed. It is more and more amalgamated with Soviet patriotism, loyalty not so much to a national culture as to a social system. It is noteworthy that the one tentative addition to the official ideology suggested by Khrushchev under Stalin has not been revived; this is the plan for the reconstruction of the countryside. There are good reasons for that abstention, but their examination leads to the exploration of the other aspect of Soviet ideology, the unofficial one.

Unofficial Ideology

As has already been stated, the content of that ideology can be only inferred, not directly observed. As material for reconstruction, one may use the direct attacks of government spokesmen supposedly quoting their opponents; government acts which can best be understood as measures to appease the non-conformists; sometimes, works of art or literature; seldom, critical articles in the Soviet press; and ingenious attempts of several teams of students of Soviet affairs to use mass interviews with recent refugees from the Soviet Union. Of course, no complete and consistent system of ideas, as a counterpart of the official ideology, shows up since, in a totalitarian State, open discussion and fixation of ideas at variance with the official ideology is not tolerated.

What exists are scattered ideas, widespread among those who do not participate in power and the advantages combined with it. By no means all of those who do not participate share these ideas, just as a large number of those who do participate pay to the official ideology only lip service. But the unofficial ideology is there and plays a definite role in the policy decisions of the holders of power. To a large extent, it is negative, i.e., it consists of items expressing the demand that certain institutions or practices based on the official ideology be abolished. What could and should replace them commonly remains vague.

First, the collectivization of agriculture is vehemently disapproved not only by the peasants but also by a large strata of the urban population who suffer from the monotony and frequent shortages of agricultural products. That it is so may be inferred, first, from the numerous acts of appeasement of the collective farmers, especially the decrease of compulsory deliveries and the increase of the rewards for them; second, from the numerous stories told in the Soviet press about the survival of "the bourgeois spirit" in the country, manifested by the illegal appropriation of land by individuals and groups; third, from rather unanimous statements appearing in the quoted interviews. This widespread dissatisfaction with an institution that embodies one of the main items of official ideology explains Khrushchev's hesitation to give to that item a fuller expression. By contrast, one may infer the existence, in the unofficial ideology, of the demand for private (perhaps somewhat limited) property of land.

Second, the collectivization of retail trade and light industry is widely disapproved. The Soviet press is full of amazing stories about ingenious devices of enterprising citizens to break through the State monopoly in economics. One of the most common devices is the formation of pseudo-cooperatives; another is the transformation of the position of a buyer or seller in the framework of a government agency into an actually independent enterprise sometimes yielding large profits to the daring individual. Interview material amply corroborates the rejection of the collectivization of trade and industry,

within the limits stated above; but it contains a significant counterpart: the unofficial ideology does not endorse going back to the system of private enterprise on the level of heavy industry and wholesale trade.

Third, the system of terrorism and the ensuing lack of personal security is abhorred and condemned. In this regard, the appeasement measures of the new rulers speak for themselves. An amnesty was granted almost immediately after Stalin's death. In May, 1955, a decree of "Socialist legality" was issued. The number of arrests and confinements to labor camps has substantially decreased. It is significant that the tilling of virgin lands in Siberia, one of Khrushchev's personal plans, has been carried out by mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Young Communists, and not by slave labor, as would have been the case under Stalin. Combined with the testimony of the refugees, these facts prove the existence, as part of the unofficial ideology, of the demand for personal security against arbitrary actions of government agencies.

Fourth, the imposition on men of science, letters and art, of official patterns of activity in their fields is strongly condemned by the intellectuals. Here, the evidence is direct. Using short periods of the relaxation of pressure Soviet authors produced works manifesting their craving for independence. The first of these periods (from the middle of 1953 to the middle of 1954) gave birth, among many other items, to I. Ehrenburg's *The Thaw*, and the second (from the middle of 1955 to the middle of 1956) witnessed the appearance of the famous novel *Not by Bread Alone*, by Dudintsev, and several short stories in the almanac *Literaturnaya Moskva* (especially volume II) which pictured realistically many dark sides of life under the Soviets. Sporadically, articles signed by great names (such as Shostakovich) were published expressing the obvious fact (denied by the official ideology) that, without freedom, no valuable creative efforts are possible. Freedom of scientific, literary, musical and artistic production must be therefore entered on the list of items composing the unofficial ideology.

Fifth, religious tolerance belongs here too. This is witnessed by the fact that the anti-

But there is no palpable demand for the truly representative institution of full-fledged political democracy. Probably the people hope that the more particular demands listed above can be extorted by indirect but obstinate pressure, while demands for constitutional changes could be fulfilled only by means of a successful upheaval. Chances for this, they know, are slim.

official ideology but rejected by the unofficial one. Lately, it has been impossible to silence completely the authors deviating from official directions; and the pitiful failure of the recent anti-religious campaign shows that, after 15 years of relative tolerance, it has become very difficult to resume a direct attack against religion. Since Stalin's death, the official ideology has been almost petrified, partly because there is nobody to unfold it. One may therefore assert the existence of a kind of uneasy equilibrium between the two ideologies.

Prediction, always difficult relative to social affairs, is exceptionally difficult in our case. The longevity of Khrushchev's regime is dubious; he is an older man; no line of succession is visible after him; why could he not be demoted as his predecessors have been? The official ideology, its interpretation and application to current problems depend strongly on the personalities of those who have to make the decisions. Therefore, without an answer to the question—who comes next?—no reliable answer to the much more important problem—what comes next?—is possible.

"This vastly increased importance of cultural diplomacy is one of the new dimensions with which we are concerned. . . . Traditionally all nations have looked upon their Ambassadors in foreign posts as representatives of their national cultures. But in times past, the cultural element in diplomacy has been taken for granted rather than dynamically developed.

“ . . . We have to know what motivates other peoples in order to know what we may expect of our neighbors, what ‘makes them tick,’ what worries them, how they look from their inner world at the outer world we all share. And it is of the utmost importance that *they* have the same kind of insights and understandings. Without knowledge and understanding, there can be no mutual confidence and no solid basis for satisfactory mutual cooperation. The reverse—misunderstanding—can lead to miscalculation and mistrust; and the grave consequences that spring therefrom.”’

—*Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State, New Dimensions in Diplomacy, November 6, 1957.*

The October Revolution of 1956 in Poland opened a door into Russia from the West. As this author evaluates Soviet control of East Europe, "events of the past four years, especially of the past 18 months, reveal that major shifts have occurred and that an important process is under way."

Russian Control of East-Central Europe

BY ROBERT F. BYRNES

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SOVIET control over the peoples of Eastern Europe has given the Soviet Union several immense advantages. It has helped to assure the frontiers of the Soviet Union against attack; it has given the Soviet Union a strong advance base in Central Europe; and it enables the Communists to operate from a "position of force." It has placed a gun at the head of Western Europe and has given the Soviet Union a veto on any solution to the unification of Germany.

In addition, it has provided a rich empire for plunder and exploitation, and it has added about 1 million men to the armed forces of the Soviet bloc. Thus, the economic relationships have favored the Soviet Union in every way; for example, an agreement which was in effect from 1945 until late 1956 provided that Poland deliver to the Soviet Union one-fifth of its coal output at a price 80 per cent lower than the price

received by Poland for coal exported to the West.

Finally, control over Eastern Europe has added votes for the Soviet camp in the United Nations and other international organizations and has strengthened the confidence of the Communists, and the fear of the neutralists; that these increments to Russian power prove that communism represents the wave of the future.

The system of control that Stalin established and his successors inherited seemed solid. Constructed after the Soviet Army had driven the Nazis from Eastern Europe, the system by 1950 had obliterated opposition parties and groups; purged the local Communist parties; and concentrated the commanding heights of political, military, and economic authority in the hands of Russians and of native Communists considered loyal to the Soviet Union. The careful and suspicious Russians maintained chains of command through several channels—the Communist parties, the Soviet diplomatic service, the secret police, trade organizations and cultural groups.

Political alliance strengthened the relationships, and economic ties, especially after 1949, were made firm, binding the economies of each satellite firmly to Moscow. In December, 1955, the five-year plan of each satellite was coordinated with that of the Soviet Union. Finally, the Soviet Union and the local Communist parties both pushed a massive program of Sovietization, designed to create new generations isolated from Western culture and influence and trained to recognize and applaud the benefits of Soviet and Communist rule.

Robert F. Byrnes served in Military Intelligence during World War II. He has taught French and Russian history at Swarthmore College, Rutgers University, and Indiana University. Director of the Mid-European Studies Center, Free Europe Committee, he is the author of *Anti-Semitism in Modern France: The Prologue to the Dreyfus Affair*, and of numerous articles on French and Russian history. He is also the general editor of a 7-volume series, *East-Central Europe under the Communists*.

The only apparent flaw in the Soviet system in Eastern Europe developed from the expulsion of Tito's Yugoslavia from the Soviet empire on June 28, 1948. The survival of Yugoslavia as an independent Communist state created a potential ideological rival and hazard for the Soviet Union. Moreover, it removed from Soviet control an important strategic area and 30 able divisions. It enabled the United States and its allies in Western Europe to end the Greek civil war, to resolve the Trieste problem, to ease the pressure against Italy, Greece, and Turkey from the Balkans, and to demonstrate by its aid program that relations between Communist and capitalist states were different from those between Communist and Communist states. Above all, the ouster of Yugoslavia and subsequent policy on the part of the Soviet Union toward Yugoslavia illuminated for the world the real character of the Soviet system and of Soviet policy.

The New Course

Shortly after the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, the new Soviet rulers apparently decided to reduce or eliminate the political liabilities they had inherited from their old master. Within the Soviet Union, they therefore spoke of collective leadership, relaxed somewhat the severely repressive system, gradually reduced considerably the prison camp population, and promised more consumer goods. This carefully controlled process seemed to hesitate after Malenkov's resignation in February, 1955, but it stuttered along through 1956 and into 1957.

Beyond the boundaries of the Soviet empire, the new approach was more dramatic. After more than two years of preliminary steps and general reconnoitering, on May 26, 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Tito in Belgrade, confessed that Tito had been wronged in 1948 and after, and sought to resume the old party and governmental relationships. Recognition of Tito by the Soviet leaders and, above all, confession that his stand was not heresy and that there were "several roads to Socialism," contributed heavily to the current Soviet crisis in Western Europe.

For Eastern Europe and the world, the greatest surprises were yet to come. At the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party, in February, 1956, the campaign of de-Stalinization reached its peak, particularly in an extraordinarily long "secret" speech by Khrushchev which ridiculed Stalin, blamed him for many military and economic disasters and for the death of many leading Communists, including pre-war leaders of the Hungarian and Polish parties, and assigned to him responsibility for the break with Tito. This caused shock and confusion among those millions of Communists who had been educated to revere Stalin. This Communist party Congress also introduced several crucial doctrinal shifts—there are several roads to socialism, war is not inevitable, and Communists can use peaceful means in democratic states to attain rule. The doctrinal points, especially that about several roads to socialism, were emphasized when Tito visited in June, 1956.

In that same month, riots broke out in Poznan in Poland, sparked originally by workers' resentment at new norms but soon spreading into an attack upon the secret police and the government. They reflected not only dissatisfaction with policies and living conditions, but also the ancient and honorable Polish anti-Russian tradition, the hatred felt for Russian actions in the last two decades, and the remarkable relaxation of Communist rule during the previous year or 18 months. The Poznan trials were unique in recent Communist history. They were public; the accused were allowed to defend themselves; confessions extorted by the police were withdrawn in the court; the police were criticized; and many grievances against economic and political conditions were aired by the defendants and their lawyers.

In October, 1956, at the eighth meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) party, the Stalinist members were ousted, and a national Communist, Gomulka, imprisoned for almost four years, was restored to the Central Committee and the Politburo and made Secretary of the Party. Moreover, in the face of Soviet threats and of Soviet troop movements, Marshal Rokossovsky was ousted

from the Politburo and the central committee, was soon afterward removed as head of the Polish armed forces, and returned to the Soviet Union.

This was followed by the removal of Soviet officers and advisors from positions in the Polish armed forces and administration, the retirement of many Stalinists from positions in the Communist party and government, the release of Cardinal Wysinski from prison and the negotiation of a new agreement between the Church and State, and negotiations in Moscow. These recognized Polish "full sovereignty and independence" and the equality of Poland and Russia, pledged Soviet non-interference in Polish politics, and provided for substantial Soviet economic aid to Poland. The Moscow agreement concluded a successful peaceful revolution, probably the only successful revolution the Poles have ever managed, and it broke the crust for further developments within Poland and in Poland's international relations.

Revolt in Hungary

Developments in Hungary followed the pattern of those in Poland until late October, when the movement went beyond a palace revolution within the Communist party and became a popular and powerful anti-Communist revolution, which brought Soviet repressive forces down on Budapest and the entire country. In the course of this revolt, Imré Nagy, the party leader who had sought to give greater emphasis to consumer goods between 1953 and 1955 and who had a reputation as a national Communist, sought the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Hungary, equal relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union, Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and the end of collectivization.

The Russians agreed to discuss troop withdrawal and announced willingness to establish a Communist "Commonwealth of Nations," only to launch a sudden heavy attack upon Budapest and all Hungary on Saturday, Nov. 3, 1956. While the outside world watched in horror, and even the neutral nations of South Asia condemned Soviet action, the Soviet forces ground down Hun-

garian resistance, deported thousands of young Hungarians to the Soviet Union, and refused to allow United Nations observers into Hungary. More than 100,000 Hungarians fled to Austria and Yugoslavia, and the United Nations bitterly condemned Soviet actions by large majority votes. A special U.N. publication in the summer of 1957, an analysis of the revolt in Hungary, proved a searing indictment of Soviet rule in Hungary and of Soviet repression, probably the most effective anti-Soviet document published since World War II.

These extraordinary developments are reflections both of Western and of Soviet policies, as well as of powerful historical forces operating in Poland and in Hungary. Since the fall of 1956, the Russians have restored full Soviet authority in Hungary and have prevented the outbreak of any disturbances in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Eastern Germany, Rumania and Albania. However, Communist rule in Hungary depends now solely on Soviet force, and the Hungarian economy is maintained only through considerable Soviet aid, which Hungary will not be able to repay at any foreseeable time.

Moreover, while Poland under Gomulka has remained Communist, even Gomulka's skill in maintaining a balance within the party between revisionists and Stalinists has been under constant strain. The economic crisis within Poland is apparently as severe as it was a year ago, and the Polish economy will remain dependent on aid from the Soviet Union and the United States until a Polish government somewhere finds the strength and wisdom to attack the basic causes for this weakness, Communist control of the economy, Communist economic policy, and the dislocation caused by Soviet policy for reshaping and exploiting the Polish economy.

The reduction of Soviet control over Poland, the Hungarian revolt and the brutal repression it called forth, and the continued independence of Tito's Yugoslavia all testify to the changes which have developed in Russia's control over its Eastern European satellites since the death of Stalin. A certain amount of mystery still prevails concerning Tito's relations with Khrushchev's Soviet government. However, even though Tito

has collaborated to a considerable degree with the Soviet government in recent months—perhaps even in the effort to keep Marshal Zhukov out of the Soviet Union until his deposition could be assured—Yugoslavia is still independent of Soviet rule and is not a satellite. So far as Western observers can see, Soviet control of all the satellite states except Poland and Hungary is as firm and rigid as before.

However, the events of the past four years, especially of the past 18 months, reveal that major shifts have occurred and that an important process is underway. The youth in particular have failed to accept the doctrine so tirelessly pounded into them, and the other privileged groups, especially the workers and intellectuals, have turned against the regimes whenever opportunity has arisen. Perhaps even in the silent states a revolutionary generation, "the generation of 1956," will rise to harass its rulers as "the children of '25" did in Russia in the nineteenth century.

Observers from the West view Eastern Europe as an inert area gradually being reorganized and reshaped by a Soviet colossus. However, the relationships between

satellite states and peoples and the Soviet regime are not so one-sided as we have hitherto believed. The ancient and proud people who live between Germany and Russia have different traditions, ideas, attitudes, customs and information than the Russians. They are influencing and educating the Russians, who are sheltered from Western ideas, at the same time that they are to some extent assimilating Soviet ideas.

Opening to the West

Consequently, the exchange is mutual and we should not neglect the subtle influence that the Poles, Germans and Czechs in particular exert upon the Russians. This influence has become particularly important since the October Revolution in Poland, which has led to the open door from the West. Through this opening and through the philosophical vacuum which now exists in Poland and throughout Eastern Europe, Western ideas now pour into Poland and into the heart of Russia. The conquered people of Poland may win their revenge and their freedom by serving as a tunnel for ideas into Russia.



"I take 'peaceful coexistence' to mean that I agree not to attack you from without and you agree not to attack me from without. But supposing you subvert me or I subvert you or both of us subvert one another from within, where then is this 'peaceful coexistence'? Is it not rather a warring coexistence? And what if one of us precisely by his ideas of man and man's freedom lays himself more open to subversion from within? Would not then the doctrine of coexistence put him at a great disadvantage? And while this disadvantage cannot and should not be overcome by war, is it not clear that the only way to meet it is by strengthening oneself in every way possible, including rearmaments, against subversion?

"There must then be some equality—not only in arms and armaments, not only in the form, let us say, of the atomic stalemate—but in the openness or closedness to outside influence and in the degree to which the government interferes or does not interfere in the thinking and acting of its citizens, before any real peaceful coexistence is possible. In short, without some measure of freedom both with respect to others and as between the government and the governed, there is no genuine peaceful coexistence. We thus see that freedom, as conditioning not only human dignity and not only human welfare, but the very possibility of peace itself, is the most dynamic principle that there is."

—Dr. Charles Malik, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon, before the United Nations General Assembly, October 8, 1957

Received At Our Desk

Russian Studies . . .

RUSSIA SINCE 1918. Four Decades of Soviet Politics. BY FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957. 490 pages, appendix, maps and indexes, \$6.50.)

A HISTORY OF SOVIET RUSSIA. BY GEORG VON RAUCH. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. 442 pages, maps, notes, chronology, index, \$6.75.)

In 1957, two new and comprehensive histories of Russia since 1917 were added to the growing literature on the Soviet Union. Frederick L. Schuman needs no introduction to CURRENT HISTORY readers. An experienced specialist in Soviet affairs, he brings to his history a sympathetic view of Russia and the Russian people. Georg von Rauch, Professor of Russian History at the University of Marburg, Germany, is less sympathetic and less optimistic about the chances of peaceful coexistence.

Each author approaches the period from 1917 to 1957 chronologically; hence much of the information is parallel. Biographical sketches of Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and current leaders are included; each history details the course of Russian events from the overthrow of the Czarist regime to the present.

Frederick Schuman writes well. He respects Marxism "as a *modus operandi* for lifting poverty stricken nations by their bootstraps to some semblance of Western living standards. . . ." Brutal? Of course. But "for the great mass of those who endured and survived the internal Inferno of the Purges and the external Hell of Hitlerism, the horrors of the 1930's and '40's and the abuses of the '50's are of small moment in everyday experience as compared with the central fact of Soviet life: the metamorphosis of the rural, miserable, illiterate, filthy, incompetent and impoverished Russia of the NEP into

the urban, hopeful, educated, clean, efficient and prosperous Russia of the Sixth Five Year Plan."

Russia's cleanliness and competence has not blinded Schuman to its defects; he recognizes "new patterns of exploitation and dehumanization deemed far worse than the old by all who are unconvinced that the end justifies the means. . . ." He thinks he sees in Khrushchev's Russia the seeds of change; but "Whether 'democracy' in any meaningful sense can or will replace despotism and oligarchy in the Soviet structure of power was an issue still beclouded on the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution." Still he believes that some sort of transition to democracy—not Western style—will eventually come.

Until then, Americans and Russians can learn to get along in a peacefully competitive world. "All Americans," he writes, "will be obliged to live in the same world with Communism for the rest of their lives and their children's lives. No 'liberation' of Russia or of China, no establishment of Western-style 'capitalism' or 'democracy' in the Eurasian Heartland is conceivable through any imaginable magic of words or weapons." Nor, conversely, will the Russian dream of world revolution extend communism throughout the Western World.

What then is the prospect for peace? In a world where war is unreasonable, "only diplomacy is left as a procedure of accommodation." For this reason, "The quest for more secure bases of coexistence appeared to require in 1957 and for long thereafter a return on both sides to the efforts of 1953-5 to negotiate settlements through bargaining and bartering."

Professor von Rauch, on the contrary, sees the "Soviet experiment" only as "a dark chapter in the history of mankind," an expression of the nihilism of our generation. His account of Russian history

is at once readable, accurate and detailed; it is also colored by his personal beliefs. Thus he sees Bolshevism as "a gigantic two-faced affair, one a product of the rationalization and mechanization of human culture; the other an expression of the irrational and demonic instincts of the human soul. . . ." He writes not of getting along with bolshevism but of "conquering" it; and its conquest requires recognition of the "dual nature of man as at once a sinful creature who is also made in the image of God."

Each of these books is carefully indexed. The Schuman book contains, in an appendix, the full text of the Soviet Constitution; the Rauch book carries a valuable chronology from 1855 to 1957. Each is a valuable addition to the reference works on the Soviet Union.

GERMAN RULE IN RUSSIA 1941-1945. A Study of Occupation Policies. BY ALEXANDER DALLIN. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1957. 695 pages, glossary and index, \$10.00.)

CHURCHILL-ROOSEVELT-STALIN. The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought. BY HERBERT FEIS. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. 692 pages with appendix and index, \$6.95.)

Mr. Dallin has indeed given us a monumental piece of work. He has explored competently and in detail the men and policies employed in the German Occupation of the East. This is a skillful tale of Nazi inefficiency, the result of "an orgy of mutual throat-cutting." Here we find a complete refutation of the argument that totalitarian systems provide greater efficiency—in fact, Mr. Dallin pauses to comment on the wondrous ability of the Nazi regime to function amidst disorder.

Not only was brutality common among the Nazi élite, it was directed against the populace. The complete subordination of the Russian people and resources to the demands of the German regime became a reality. The "war against Bolshevism" was a euphemism for the master plan "not merely to overthrow the Soviet state but to make the East, with its resources and manpower, the servant of the German

Herrenvolk. The grand design called not only for a change of borders, but also for a drastic reshuffling of the hierarchy of ethnic groups in the East, as a result of which the Germans would emerge as masters. . . ."

From his perspective of 10 years, Mr. Dallin draws the interesting thought that had the Nazi occupation not alienated the Soviet people, it might have widened the rift that even then existed between Stalin and his people, and opened the door for them to a third alternative between the totalitarian poles of communism and nazism.

In *Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin*, Mr. Feis has documented the negotiations among the Big Three during the course of the Second World War. At best, the union of Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt was an awkward alliance in which the West was forced to support a government with which it was ideologically at odds. This book, overly long and laboriously detailed, exposes the political issues which motivated the policies and actions of the 3 protagonists.

It is of interest to read this book against the background of *German Rule in Russia*. For its recurrent theme is the oft repeated demand of Stalin that his allies, Britain and the United States, alleviate Nazi pressure on his country by setting up a second front in the West. Mr. Dallin has already explained the cruelty of the Nazis in the U.S.S.R.

SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY: Patterns and Prospects. EDITED BY JOHN L. STIPP. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957. 258 pages and index, \$4.00.)

This well-arranged anthology covers the vital historical ground—Russia since 1917. Selections are excellent and editor John L. Stipp unifies them with italicized introductory and concluding comments. Several who write of the "Shape of Communist Things Today and to Come" seem to echo Philip E. Mosely's conviction that the Soviet regime "remains a powerful, centralized, secretive and determined force in world politics." What will the future bring to the Russians and the world?

Hans Kohn is not optimistic, but Maurice Hindus and Barrington Moore, Jr. see ground for hope. In the concluding selection, John Plamenatz notes that the Russian leaders "are not mad," and outlines a program for coexistence. "We must," he writes, "knowing how they see our world and interpret it, make it look the sort of place where it would be unprofitable and even dangerous for them to make trouble. We must look formidable to them and yet not seem to threaten their security. We cannot rely on their goodwill, but we can, if we act wisely, rely on their patience."

With much of interest, much that is illuminating, this book has the weakness of all anthologies: it is artificially unified and at times superficial.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE EAST. 1920-1927. A Documentary Survey. BY XENIA JOUKOFF EUDIN AND ROBERT C. NORTH. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. 396 pages, chronology, bibliography, bibliographical notes and index, \$10.00.)

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE WEST. 1920-1927. A Documentary Survey. BY XENIA JOUKOFF EUDIN AND HAROLD H. FISHER. In collaboration with Rosemary Brown Jones. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. 409 pages, chronology, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

The authors of this scholarly and comprehensive two volume documentary survey see the period from 1920 to 1927 as the first stage of attempted "peaceful coexistence." Documents are arranged chronologically but are divided under subject headings. Many official documents are included but an effort is made to include also letters, speeches and political papers indicating the "unofficial and extralegal" activities of Soviet leaders. Students of Russian affairs, of history and of international politics will find these translations from Russian sources of great value. Each section is discussed in an introduction by the editors. *Soviet Russia and the East* contains excerpts from 118 documents; *Soviet Russia and the West* contains excerpts from 143 documents. It is

to be hoped that the Hoover Institute and Library and the Slavic Fellowship Program will continue to publish documents illuminating Russian history.

THE SOVIET 1956 STATISTICAL HANDBOOK: A COMMENTARY. BY NAUM JASNY. (Michigan: The Michigan State University Press, 1957. 202 pages, appendices and index, \$4.95.)

The average student of Soviet affairs would be hard pressed to evaluate Soviet statistics. In this valuable handbook, Naum Jasny, well-known specialist on Soviet statistics, analyzes the most recent Soviet statistical publication, pointing out facts and omissions of facts, propaganda and the information that underlies it. Here the reader will find Soviet statistics carefully evaluated.

THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. BY JOHN N. HAZARD. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957. 197 pages, charts, appendix, bibliographical notes and index, \$4.00.)

Professor of Public Law, John N. Hazard approaches the history of the Soviet Union from the viewpoint of a lawyer and political scientist. Students of comparative government will find his analysis stimulating; unlike some similar studies, the evaluation is sharpened by the author's keen observations and excellent writing. He too sees a good many changes in recent Soviet history: although "there has been no reason to think that Stalin's heirs intend to institute a democratic system of government," there are pressures at work forcing leaders to make concessions. In his concluding chapter, "The Peril Points," the Soviet experience is used to illustrate the ways in which a dictator can prevent the functioning of democratic forms. The Peril Points are those points at which a dictator can "counterweight" these democratic forms to make them meaningless. Among these points are: party discipline, press and speech restrictions, a dependent judiciary, the role of a security police. "Democratic forms do not assure democratic government," and nowhere is this clearer than in the Soviet experience.

BOLSHEVISM IN TURKESTAN. 1917-1927. BY ALEXANDER G. PARK. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. 388 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.75.)

There are some 20 million Muslims East of the Caspian Sea under the political control of the U.S.S.R. This study of Russian nationality policy represents research at Columbia University's Russian Institute. Painstaking effort is evident throughout this scholarly study, which starts with the history of bolshevism in Central Asia, and continues to 'evaluate political goals, the Soviet relationship with Islam, and economic achievements since 1917. The author concludes that "increasing native participation in local administrative and political organs has been accompanied by a steady concentration of the crucial processes of decision making in centralized agencies located in Moscow." In his opinion, "Soviet policy has given rise to new forms of exploitation which in the context of Russia's nationality problem may only be described as Soviet colonialism."

YEAR OF CRISIS. Communist Propaganda Activities in 1956. EDITED BY EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. 398 pages, bibliography, charts, maps, photographs and index, \$5.50.)

For the student of Soviet affairs, this study of Communist propaganda techniques and activities is a valuable addition to the library. The author provides "A Chronology of Principal Events of Propaganda Significance During 1956" which helps guide the reader through the detailed analysis that follows. The book, a sequel to "Target: the World," is, as the editor points out, "a cooperative work" by many anonymous researchers. After a general discussion of Communist propaganda in 1956 and the party organization and apparatus, the discussion focuses on Communist propaganda in specific regions of the world and concludes with an analysis of "Communist Media as Channels for the Communist Message." Illustrations and tables add interest.

East Europe . . .

THE HERETIC. The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito. BY FITZROY MACLEAN. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957. 436 pages, appendix and index; with illustrations, \$5.95.)

In this biography of President Tito, there is a close identification of the man and his country; Tito's narrative becomes that of Yugoslavia also. The author gives an interesting account of the ascendancy of Tito within his own country and in the cold war between East and West.

The crisis for Yugoslavia and Tito came with his excommunication from the Communist orbit. Tito, whose Communist days began when he spent several years in Russia following his capture during the First World War, had been a loyal member of the Yugoslav Communist party. By his competency and unquestioning fidelity, he had by 1937 achieved the rank of Secretary General. During the war years, he mobilized his partisan movement to harass the Nazis. Eliminating his adversaries, he made himself the No. 1 power. And it was this last which Moscow questioned. The split between Moscow and Belgrade forced Tito to choose country over party, and to become "the heretic" of the Communist camp.

NAGY ON COMMUNISM. In Defense of the New Course. BY IMRE NAGY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. 306 pages, \$5.50.)

This book is Nagy's defense of his new course to his former associates on the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party following his ouster from the party and the government. He argues in favor of the new course with its more liberal policies which followed the death of Stalin and the commencement of "collective leadership" and "peaceful coexistence." Mr. Nagy served as Prime Minister of Hungary from 1953 to 1955 after Matyas Rakosi was deprived of his double position as Prime Minister and First Secretary of the Communist Party, retaining only the latter post. Nagy

called for relief for the peasants, the lightening of the burdens of intense industrialization, more freedom of thought and speech.

Although a firm adherent to the Communist party, he believed in the possibility of following different paths to socialism and called for the restoration of ties with Tito's Yugoslavia.

His book reveals the tension and cacophony within the Hungarian Communist party, between the Stalinists and the "deviationists," writ large in the revolt of November, 1956.

THE ECONOMICS OF COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE. BY NICHOLAS SPULBER. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, published jointly with The Technology Press, M.I.T., 1957. 525 pages, bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

Mr. Spulber has thoroughly analyzed the economies of the 6 satellite countries of East-Central Europe: Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (not quite of satellite status). "Sovietization" of the economies of these countries has resulted in the subordination of their needs to those of the Soviet Union.

In effect, the Soviet Union has carried through the same program initiated within its own borders: the emphasis on heavy over light industry with complete disregard for the consumer. The author asserts that it is the aim of the Kremlin

to forge out of the economies of the East European countries a "second world market" which will absorb the imbalances in the Soviet economy and supplement its deficiencies.

THE UNITED STATES AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE 1914-1918. A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda. BY VICTOR S. MAMATEY. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. 431 pages, bibliography and index, \$7.50.)

Rather than the study in Wilsonian politics which this book purports to be, it is actually a diplomatic history of World War I. It covers in particular the nationalistic aspirations of the subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary and other areas of East-Central Europe. It outlines in great thoroughness the events leading to the peace of 1918 which remade the map of Europe to satisfy the demands of the Slavic minorities.

When the author does deal with President Wilson, it is to explode the Wilsonian myth, the ideal of Wilson as the champion of the oppressed. He argues that independence for the nations of East-Central Europe was their own achievement. The United States helped by aiding the defeat of the Central Powers and thus removing the main obstacle: "that was the greatest Allied contribution to the freedom of the peoples of East Central Europe."



"What do we mean by freedom under law? We mean a great deal more, surely, than mere obedience to written laws. We mean acknowledgment of the fact that there are moral limitations on civil power. We mean that human beings have rights, *as human beings*, which are superior to what may be thought to be the rights of the state, or of society. This is the truth which all men of good will must some day see. It is the truth exemplified in the Magna Carta and in the American Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights. . . .

"Freedom can be won only in struggle; and once won, no matter how ably recorded in writing for posterity, it can never be assured to any new-generation not willing to fight for it. When freedom becomes ingrained in the civilization of a people, when they understand it, cherish it, and guard it, when their institutions bespeak it and their daily lives are guided by it, when they love it more than life and covet it not merely for themselves but for each other, then only is it truly theirs. . . ."

—Charles S. Rhyne, *President-Elect, American Bar Association, July 28, 1957.*

Current Documents

Declaration of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries

Thirteen delegates from Communist bloc nations met in Moscow, November 14-16, 1957. A joint communique was issued by 12 of these countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, North Vietnam, East Germany, China, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, with the exception of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Veljko Micunovic asserted, "You must read the declaration carefully and you will see why we did not agree."

Major portions of the text of this agreement are reprinted below.

Representatives of the Albanian Party of Labor, the Bulgarian Communist party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' party, the Vietnamese Working People's party, the Socialist Unity party of Germany, the Communist party of China, the Korean Party of Labor, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary party, the Polish United Workers' party, the Rumanian Workers' party, the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Communist party of Czechoslovakia discussed their relations, current problems of the international situation and the struggle for peace and socialism.

The exchange of opinions revealed identity of views of the parties on all the questions examined at the meeting and unanimity in their assessment of the international situation. In the course of the discussion the meeting also touched upon general problems of the international Communist movement. In drafting the declaration the participants in the meeting consulted with representatives of the fraternal parties in the capitalist countries. The fraternal parties not present at this meeting will assess and themselves decide what action they should take on the considerations expressed in the declaration.

[1]

The main content of our epoch is the transition from capitalism to socialism which was begun by the great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. Today more than a third of the population of the world—over 950,000,000 people—have taken the road of

socialism and are building a new life. The tremendous growth of the forces of socialism has stimulated the rapid extension of the anti-imperialist national movement in the post-war period. During the last twelve years, besides the Chinese People's Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, over 700,000,000 people have shaken off the colonial yoke and established national independent states.

The peoples of the colonial and dependent countries, still languishing in slavery, are intensifying the struggle for national liberation. The progress of socialism and of the national liberation movement has greatly accelerated the disintegration of imperialism. With regard to the greater part of mankind imperialism has lost its one-time domination. In the imperialist countries society is rent by deep-going class contradictions and by antagonisms between those countries, while the working class is putting up increasing resistance to the policy of imperialism and the monopolies, fighting for better conditions, democratic rights, for peace and socialism.

In our epoch, world development is determined by the course and results of the competition between two diametrically opposed social systems. In the past forty years socialism has demonstrated that it is a much higher social system than capitalism. It has insured development of the productive forces at a rate unprecedented and impossible for capitalism, and the raising of the material and cultural levels of the working people.

The Soviet Union's strides in economy, science and technology and the results achieved by the other Socialist countries in Socialist construction are conclusive evidence of the great vitality of socialism. In the Socialist states the broad masses of the working people enjoy genuine freedom and democratic rights. People's power insures political unity of the masses, equality and friendship among the nations and a foreign policy aimed at preserving universal peace and rendering assistance to the oppressed nations in their emancipation struggle. The world Socialist system, which is growing and becoming stronger, is exerting ever greater influence upon the international situation in the interests of peace and progress and the freedom of the peoples.

While socialism is on the upgrade, imperialism is heading toward decline. The positions of imperialism have been greatly weakened as a result of the disintegration of the colonial system. The countries that have shaken off the yoke of colonialism are defending their independence and fighting for economic sovereignty, for international peace.

The existence of the Socialist system and the aid rendered by the Socialist nations to these countries on principles of equality and cooperation between them and the Socialist nations in the struggle for peace and against aggression help them to uphold their national freedom and facilitate their social progress.

In the imperialist countries the contradictions between the productive forces and production relations have become acute. In many respects modern science and engineering are not being used in the interests of social progress for all mankind, because capitalism fetters and deforms the development of the productive forces of society.

The world capitalist economy remains shaky and unstable. The relatively good economic activity still observed in a number of capitalist countries is due in large measure to the arms drive and other transient factors. However, the capitalist economy is bound to encounter deeper slumps and crises. The temporary high business activity helps to keep up the reformist illusions among part of the workers in the capitalist countries.

In the post-war period some sections of the working class in the more advanced capitalist countries, fighting against increased exploitation and for a higher standard of living, have been able to win certain wage increases, though in a number of these countries real wages are below the pre-war level. However, in the greater part of the capitalist world, particularly in the colonial and dependent countries, millions of working people still live in poverty. The broad invasion of agriculture by the monopolies and the price policy dictated by them, the system of bank credits and loans and the increased taxation caused by the arms drive have resulted in the steady ruin and impoverishment of the main mass of the peasantry.

* * *

The policy of certain aggressive groups in the United States is aimed at rallying around them all the reactionary forces of the capitalist world. Acting in this way they are becoming the center of world reaction, the sworn enemies of the people. By this policy these anti-popular, aggressive imperialist forces are courting their own ruin, creating their own grave-diggers.

So long as imperialism exists there will always be soil for aggressive wars. Throughout the post-war years the American, British, French and other imperialists and their stooges have conducted and are conducting wars in Indochina, Indonesia, Korea, Malaya, Kenya, Guatemala, Egypt, Algeria, Oman and Yemen.

At the same time the aggressive imperialist forces flatly refuse to cut armaments, to prohibit the use and production of atomic and hydrogen weapons, to agree on immediate discontinuation of the tests of these weapons; they are continuing the "cold war" and arms drive, building more military bases and conducting the aggressive policy of undermining peace and creating the danger of a new war. Were a world war to break out before agreement on prohibition of nuclear weapons is reached, it would inevitably become a nuclear war unprecedented in destructive force.

In West Germany militarism is being revived with United States help, giving rise to a hotbed of war in the heart of Europe.

The struggle against West German militarism and revanchism, which are now threatening peace, is a vital task facing the peace-loving forces of the German people and all the nations of Europe. An especially big role in this struggle belongs to the German Democratic Republic—the first worker-peasant state in German history—with which the participants in the meeting express their solidarity and which they fully support.

Simultaneously the imperialists are trying to impose on the freedom-loving peoples of the Middle East the notorious "Eisenhower-Dulles Doctrine," thereby creating the danger of war in this area. They are plotting conspiracies and provocations against independent Syria. The provocations against Syria and Egypt and other Arab countries pursue the aim of dividing and isolating the Arab countries in order to abolish their freedom and independence.

The SEATO aggressive bloc is a source of war danger in East Asia.

The question of war or peaceful coexistence is now the crucial question of world policy. All the nations must display the utmost vigilance in regard to the war danger created by imperialism.

At present the forces of peace have so grown that there is a real possibility of averting wars, as was demonstrated by the collapse of the imperialist designs in Egypt. The imperialist plan to use the counter-revolutionary forces for the overthrow of the people's democratic system in Hungary have failed as well.

* * *

An alliance of these mighty forces could prevent war, but should the bellicose imperialist maniacs venture, regardless of anything, to unleash a war, imperialism will doom itself to destruction, for the peoples will not tolerate a system that brings them so much suffering and exacts so many sacrifices.

The Communist and workers' parties taking part in the meeting declare that the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of the two systems, which has been further developed and brought up to date in the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party, is the sound basis of the foreign policy of the Socialist coun-

tries and the dependable pillar of peace and friendship among the peoples. The idea of peaceful coexistence coincides with the five principles advanced jointly by the Chinese People's Republic and the Republic of India and with the program adopted by the Bandung Conference of African-Asian countries. Peace and peaceful coexistence have now become the demands of the broad masses in all countries.

The Communist parties regard the struggle for peace as their foremost task. They will do all in their power to prevent war.

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[3]

The victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and progress in Socialist construction in the People's Democracies find deep sympathy among the working class and the working people of all countries. The ideas of socialism are winning additional millions of people. In these conditions the imperialist bourgeoisie attaches increasing importance to the ideological molding of the masses; it misrepresents socialism and smears Marxism-Leninism, misleads and confuses the masses. It is a prime task to intensify Marxist-Leninist education of the masses, combat bourgeois ideology, expose the lies and slanderous fabrications of imperialist propaganda against socialism and the Communist movement and widely propagate in simple and convincing fashion the ideas of socialism, peace and friendship among nations.

The meeting confirmed the identity of views of the Communist and Workers' parties on the cardinal problems of the Socialist revolution and Socialist construction. The experience of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries has fully borne out the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist proposition that the processes of the Socialist revolution and the building of socialism are governed by a number of basic laws applicable in all countries embarking on a socialist course. These laws manifest themselves everywhere, alongside a great variety of historic national peculiarities and traditions which must by all means be taken into account.

* * *

In condemning dogmatism, the Communist parties believe that the main danger at present is revisionism or, in other words, right-wing opportunism, which as a manifestation of bourgeois ideology paralyzes the revolutionary energy of the working class and demands the preservation or restoration of capitalism. However, dogmatism and sectarianism can also be the main danger at different phases of development in one party or another. It is for each Communist party to decide what danger threatens it more at a given time.

The experience of the international Communist movement shows that resolute defense by the Communist and Workers' parties of the Marxist-Leninist unity of their ranks and the banning of factions and groups sapping unity guarantee the successful solution of the tasks of the socialist revolution, the establishment of socialism and communism.

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* * *

At present, the struggle of the working class and the masses of the people against the war danger and for their vital interests is spearheaded against the big monopoly group of capital as those chiefly responsible for the arms race, as those who organize or inspire plans for preparing a new world war and who are the bulwark of aggression and reaction. The interests and the policy of this handful of monopolies conflict increasingly not only with the interests of the working class, but the other sections of capitalist society: the peasants, intellectuals, petty and middle urban bourgeoisie.

In those capitalist countries where the American monopolies are out to establish their hegemony and in the countries already suffering from the U. S. policy of economic and military expansion, the objective conditions are being created for uniting, under the leadership of the working class and its revolutionary parties, broad sections of the population to fight for peace, the defense of national independence and democratic freedoms, to raise the standard of living, to carry through radical land reforms and to overthrow the rule of the monopolies who betray the national interests.

The profound historic changes and decisive switch in the balance of forces in the

international sphere in favor of socialism and the tremendous growth of the power of attraction exerted by Socialist ideas among the working class, working peasantry and working intelligentsia create more favorable conditions for the victory of socialism.

The forms of the transition of socialism may vary for different countries. The working class and its vanguard—the Marxist-Leninist party—seek to achieve the Socialist revolution by peaceful means. This would accord with the interests of the working class and the people as a whole as well as with the national interests of the country.

Today in a number of capitalist countries the working class headed by its vanguard has the opportunity, given a united working class and popular front or other workable forms of agreement and political cooperation between the different parties and public organizations to unite a majority of the people to win state power without civil war and ensure the transfer of the basic means of production to the hands of the people. Relying on the majority of the people and decisively rebuffing the opportunist elements incapable of relinquishing the policy of compromise with the capitalists and landlords, the working class can defeat the reactionary, anti-popular forces, secure a firm majority in parliament, transform parliament from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people, launch a non-parliamentary mass struggle, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions for peaceful realization of the socialist revolution.

All this will be possible only by broad and ceaseless development of the class struggle of the workers, peasant masses and the urban middle strata against big monopoly capital, against reaction, for profound social reforms for peace and socialism.

In the event of the ruling classes resorting to violence against people, the possibility of non-peaceful transition to socialism should be borne in mind. Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily. In this case the degree of bitterness and the forms of the class struggle will depend not so much on the proletariat as on the resist-

ance put up by the reactionary circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, on these circles using force at one or another stage of the struggle for socialism.

The possibility of one or another way to socialism depends on the concrete conditions in each country.

In the struggle for better conditions for the working people, for preservation and extension of democratic rights, winning and maintaining national independence and peace among nations, and also in the struggle for winning power and building socialism, the Communist parties seek cooperation with the Socialist parties. Although the Right-wing Socialist party leaders are doing their best to hamper this cooperation, there are increasing opportunities for cooperation between the Communists and Socialists on many issues. The ideological differences between the Communist and the Socialist parties should not keep them from establishing unity of action on the many pressing issues that confront the working class movement.

In the Socialist countries where the working class is in power, the Communist and Workers' parties which have the opportunity to establish close relations with the broad masses of the people should constantly rely on them and make the building and defense of socialism the cause of millions who fully realize that they are masters of their country. Of great importance for enhancing the activity and creative initiative of the broad masses and their solidarity, for consolidating the Socialist system and stepping up Socialist construction are the measures taken in recent years by the Socialist countries to expand Socialist democracy and encourage criticism and self-criticism.

To bring about real solidarity of the working class, of all working people and the whole of progressive mankind, of the freedom-loving and peace-loving forces of the world, it is necessary above all to promote the unity of the Communist and Workers' parties, to foster solidarity between the Communist and Workers' parties of all countries. This solidarity is the core of still greater solidarity, it is the main guarantee of the victory of the cause of the working class.

The Communist and Workers' parties have a particularly important responsibility with regard to the destinies of the world Socialist system and the International Communist movement. The Communist and Workers' parties represented at the meeting declare that they will tirelessly promote their unity and comradely cooperation with a view to further consolidating the commonwealth of Socialist states and in the interests of the international working class movement, of peace and socialism.

The meeting notes with satisfaction that the International Communist movement has grown, withstood numerous serious trials and won a number of major victories. By their deeds the Communists have demonstrated to the working people on a world-wide scale the vitality of the Marxist-Leninist theory and their ability not only to propagate the great ideals of socialism, but also to realize them in exceedingly strenuous conditions.

Contrary to the absurd assertions of imperialism about a so-called crisis of communism, the Communist movement is growing and gathering strength. The historic decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. [the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] are of tremendous importance, not only to the C.P.S.U. and to the building of communism in the U.S.S.R., they have opened a new stage in the world Communist movement and pushed ahead its further development along Marxist-Leninist lines. The results of the congresses of the Communist parties of China, France, Italy and other countries in recent times have clearly demonstrated the unity and solidarity of the party ranks and their loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism. This meeting of the representatives of Communist and Workers' parties testifies to the international solidarity of the Communist movement.

After exchanging views, the participants in the meeting arrived at the conclusion that in present conditions it is expedient, besides bilateral meetings of leading personnel and exchange of information, to hold, as the need arises, more representative conferences of Communist and Workers' parties to discuss current problems, share experience, study each other's views and attitudes and concert

action in the joint struggle for the common goals—peace, democracy and socialism.

The participants in the meeting unanimously express their firm confidence that, by closing their ranks and thereby rallying the working class and the peoples of all

countries, the Communist and Workers' parties will surmount all obstacles in their onward movement and accelerate further big victories for the cause of peace, democracy and socialism:

The Soviet I.C.B.M.

On August 26, 1957, the U.S.S.R. reported that it fired accurately and successfully an intercontinental ballistic missile. Below is reprinted the text of the Soviet announcement.

In conformity with the scientific research program, successful tests of an intercontinental ballistic rocket as well as explosions of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons have taken place in the Soviet Union.

A super-long-distance intercontinental multi-stage ballistic rocket was launched a few days ago. The tests of the rocket were successful. They fully confirmed the correctness of the calculations and the selected design.

The rocket flew at a very high, unprecedented altitude. Covering a huge distance in a brief time the rocket landed in the target area. The results obtained show that it is possible to direct rockets into any part of the world.

The solution of the problem of designing international ballistic rockets will make it possible to reach remote areas without resorting to a strategic air force, which at the present time is vulnerable to up-to-date means of anti-aircraft defense.

Taking into consideration the tremendous contribution to the advance of science and the great importance of this scientific-technical achievement for strengthening the defense potential of the Soviet state, the Soviet Government express gratitude to a large group of workers who have taken part in designing and manufacturing the intercontinental ballistic rocket, and the complex of facilities for their launching.

A series of explosions of nuclear and thermonuclear (hydrogen) weapons has been staged in the U.S.S.R. in recent days. In order to insure the safety of the population the explosions were set off at a high altitude. The tests were successful.

In connection with the above-mentioned tests Tass has been authorized to state . . . :

The problem of disarmament, including the question of banning atomic and hydrogen weapons and the question of stopping their tests, has been discussed for many years in the United Nations without producing any results.

The Soviet Government, undeviatingly carrying through a policy of peace, has more than once submitted concrete proposals for a substantial reduction of the armed forces and armaments of states, on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, on the cessation of tests of these weapons, and on other measures connected with the disarmament problem. The Western powers, however, have not yet taken any practicable steps in the field of disarmament. On the contrary, they create all kinds of obstacles to agreements on this highly important problem of our times.

It is common knowledge that the U.S.A. and its partners not only reject the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, but in fact do not want agreement on the unconditional and immediate cessation of the tests of nuclear weapons while staging large series of tests of these weapons. Encountering such an obviously negative attitude on the part of the Western powers, primarily the U.S.A., toward a positive solution of the disarmament problem, the Soviet Government has been impelled to take all necessary measures with the object of safeguarding the security of the Soviet state.

At the same time the Soviet Government will continue persistently to press for agreement on the cessation of tests and the prohibition of atomic weapons, on the problem of disarmament as a whole, in a positive solution of which all the peoples of the world are interested.

Sputnik I

On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union announced the successful launching of the first man-made satellite in connection with the International Geophysical Year. Below is the text of the statement:

For several years research and experimental designing work has been under way in the Soviet Union to create artificial satellites of the earth. It has already been reported in the press that the launching of the earth satellites in the U.S.S.R. was planned in accordance with the program of the International Geophysical Year research.

As a result of the intensive work by research institutes and designing bureaus the first artificial earth satellite in the world has now been created. This first satellite was successfully launched in the U.S.S.R. on October 4.

According to preliminary information the carrier rocket has imparted to the satellite the required orbital velocity of about 8,000 meters (26,000 feet) a second. At the present time the satellite is describing elliptical trajectories around the earth. Its flight will be observed in the rays of the rising and setting sun with the aid of the simplest optical instruments such as binoculars and spy-glasses.

According to calculations which are being supplemented by direct observation the satellite will travel at altitudes of up to 900 kilometers (500 miles) above the surface of the earth. A complete revolution of the satellite will take one hour and thirty-five minutes. Its orbit is inclined at an angle of 65 degrees to the equatorial plane. Tomorrow the satellite will pass twice over the Moscow area, at 1:46 A.M., and at 6:42 A.M. Moscow time.

Reports about the subsequent movement of the first artificial satellite launched in the U.S.S.R. on the 4th of October will be issued regularly by Soviet broadcasting stations.

The satellite is of spherical shape, fifty-eight centimeters (about twenty-two inches) in diameter and weighs 83.6 kilograms (about 184 pounds). It is fitted with steel radio transmitters continuously emitting signals at a frequency of 20.005 and 40.002 megacycles or 15 and 7.5 meters wavelengths respectively.

The power of the transmitter is such as to ensure reliable reception by a broad range of amateurs. The signals are of the nature of telegraph signals at about zero point three seconds duration with a pause of the same duration. The signals of one frequency are sent during the pauses in the signals of the other frequency.

Scientific stations at various points in the Soviet Union are conducting observations of the satellite and determining elements of its trajectory. Since the density of the rarified upper layers of the atmosphere is not accurately known there are no data available at present for determining the exact period of the satellite's existence or the point of its entry into the denser layers of the atmosphere.

Calculations have shown that owing to the tremendous velocity of the satellite at the end of its existence it will burn up on reaching the denser layers of the atmosphere at an altitude of several scores of kilometers.

The possibility of cosmic flight with the help of rockets was first scientifically substantiated in Russia, as early as the end of the nineteenth century, in the works of the outstanding Russian scientist Konstantin Tsiolkovsky.

The successful launching of the first man-made earth satellite makes a tremendous contribution to the treasure house of world science and culture. The scientific experiment staged at such a great height is of great importance for fathoming the properties of cosmic space and for studying earth as part of our solar system.

The Soviet Union proposes to send up several more artificial satellites during the International Geophysical Year. These will be bigger and heavier and will help to carry out an extensive program of . . . research.

Artificial earth satellites will pave the way for space travel and it seems that the present generation will witness how the freed and conscious labor of the people of the new socialist society turns even the most daring of man's dreams into a reality.

Sputnik II

On November 3, 1957, the second earth satellite, carrying scientific instruments and an experimental dog, was launched. The texts of the Soviet announcements of this event follow:

First Tass Announcement

The second artificial earth satellite was launched in the Soviet Union on 3rd November. According to available information it represents the last stage of the carrier rocket housing containers with scientific instruments and radio transmitters.

The containers with apparatus weigh 508.3 kilograms (1,120.29 pounds). The satellite carries a container with an experimental animal (a dog).

The satellite has been given an orbital velocity of about 8,000 meters per second (17,895 miles an hour). Its maximum distance from the earth exceeds 1,500 kilometers (932 miles). The time of a complete circuit around the earth is approximately 102 minutes.

Second Tass Announcement

In conformity with the International Geophysical Year program for studying the upper layers of the atmosphere as well as the physical processes and conditions of life in cosmic space, the second artificial earth satellite was launched in the Soviet Union on 3rd November.

The second artificial satellite developed in the U.S.S.R. represents the last stage of the carrier rocket housing containers with scientific instruments.

The second artificial satellite carries instruments for studying solar radiation in the short wave ultra violet and X-ray regions of the spectrum, instruments for cosmic ray studies, instruments for studying the temperature and pressure, an airtight container with an experimental animal (a dog), an air conditioning system, food and instruments for studying life processes in the conditions of cosmic space, measuring instruments for transmitting the results of scientific measurements to the earth, two radio transmitters operating on frequencies of

40,002 and 20,005 kilocycles and the necessary power sources.

The total weight of the apparatus mentioned above, the experimental animal and power sources amounts to 508.3 kilograms (1,120.29 pounds).

According to observations the satellite has been given an orbital velocity of about 8,000 meters per second.

According to calculations which are being verified at present by direct observations, the maximum distance of the equator is approximately 65 degrees.

The time of one complete circuit is about one hour, 42 minutes. The angle of the incline of the orbit to the plane of the satellite from the earth's surface exceeds 1,500 kilometers.

According to information received from the satellite, the scientific instruments and control of the life processes in the animal are proceeding normally.

On 3rd November the second artificial satellite passed over Moscow at 7:20 A.M. and will appear again at 9:05 A.M.

The signals of the satellite's radio transmitters on the 20,005 kilocycles are given in the form of telegraph beats lasting about 0.3 seconds with a pause of an equal duration. The 40,002 kilocycles transmitter emits continually.

By the successful launching of the second artificial earth satellite with diverse scientific instruments and an experimental animal, Soviet scientists are extending the program of studying cosmic space and upper layers of the atmosphere. The unfathomed natural processes going on in the cosmos will now become more understandable to man.

The workers of research institutes, designing bureaus, the testers and industry workers who created the second Soviet artificial satellite of the earth dedicate its launching to the fortieth anniversary of the great October Socialist revolution.

Moscow Radio Report

The rotation period of the second satellite around the earth amounts to 1 hour 43.7 minutes—this is $7\frac{1}{2}$ minutes more than the rotation period of the first satellite at the time of the beginning of its movement.

Despite a considerable increase of the weight of the scientific and measurement equipment, which amounts to over half a

ton, the second satellite was given a greater velocity in its flight at the time of reaching its orbit, with a view to prolonging its life.

In consequence of the increase of the initial speed, the second satellite is moving along a higher orbit, whose maximum distance from the surface of the earth amounts to 1,700 kilometers [1,056 miles], that is by 800 kilometers [497 miles] higher than the orbit of the first satellite.

Ouster of Marshal Zhukov

On November 2, 1957, the ouster of Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov from the Presidium and the Central Committee of the Communist party was announced. The text of the announcement and resolution of the plenary meeting of the Central Committee follows:

Announcement

A plenary meeting of the Communist party's Central Committee was held late in October. It discussed the improvement of party and political work in the Soviet Army and Navy.

The plenary meeting adopted a resolution which has been made public today. The plenary meeting has excluded Georgi K. Zhukov from membership of the Presidium of the Central Committee and from the Central Committee of the Communist party.

Resolution

Text of the resolution adopted by the plenary meeting of the Central Committee on the improvement of party and political work within the Soviet Army and Navy:

Having scored an epochal victory in the Great Patriotic War [World War II], armed forces of the Soviet Union proved to be equal to their tasks and justified the affection and trust of the Soviet peoples with honor.

Thanks to the concern of the Communist party and the Soviet Government, the general progress of the national economy of our country, big successes in the development of heavy industry, science, and technology, the armed forces of the Soviet Union have reached in the post-war years new heights in their development. They are equipped with all kinds of modern military techniques and arms, including atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons, and rockets.

The political awareness and morale of our

troops are high. The commanding and political cadres of the Army and Navy are boundlessly loyal to their people, the Soviet homeland and the Communist party.

The plenary meeting of the Central Committee believes that especially important for the solution of these tasks is the further improvement of party and political work within the Soviet Army and Navy, work which is to enhance the might of our armed forces, to rally the servicemen around the Communist party and the Soviet Government, to educate them in the spirit of friendship between the Soviet peoples and proletarian internationalism. Yet there are still serious shortcomings in practical party and political work, and sometimes it is even underestimated.

The Twentieth Party Congress set before the party and the people the task of maintaining our defenses abreast of up-to-date war techniques and science, insuring the security of our Socialist state. Along with commanders exercising single authority, an important part in the accomplishment of this task belongs to the military councils, political organs and party organizations of the Army and Navy.

The chief well-spring of the might of our Army and Navy lies in the fact that the Communist party—the guiding directing force of Soviet society—is their organizer, leader and instructor. We must always remember V. I. Lenin's directive that the "policy of the military establishment, as of all other establishments and institutions, is pursued in

strict accordance with the general directives given by the party through its Central Committee and under its direct control."

The plenary meeting of the Central Committee notes that of late former Defense Minister Comrade Zhukov has violated the Leninist party principles of guiding the armed forces, pursued a policy of curtailing the work of party organizations, political organs and military councils, of abolishing the leadership and control of the party, its Central Committee and Government over the Army and Navy.

The plenary meeting of the Central Committee has established that the cult of Comrade Zhukov's personality was cultivated in the Soviet Army with his personal participation. With the help of sycophants and flatterers, he was praised to the sky in lectures and reports, in articles, films and pamphlets, and his person and role in the Great Patriotic War were over-glorified.

Thereby, to please Comrade Zhukov, the true history of the war was distorted; the actual state of affairs was presented in a wrong light, the stupendous efforts of the Soviet people were minimized, as well as the valor of all our armed forces, the role of their commanders and political workers, the military skill of the commanders of fronts, armies, fleets, the leading and inspiring role of the Communist party of the Soviet Union.

The party and the Government paid tribute to the services rendered by Comrade Zhukov, promoted him to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, awarded him four gold stars of Hero of the Soviet Union, and decorated him with numerous orders.

He was also vested with great political trust. At the Twentieth party congress he

was elected to the Central Committee, while the Central Committee elected him an alternate member of its Presidium, and later a Presidium member.

But owing to an insufficient appreciation of the party principles, Zhukov took a wrong view of these high tributes to his services, lost the Communist modesty which Lenin taught us, imagined that he was the sole hero of all the victories achieved by our people and their armed forces under the Communist party's leadership, and began flagrantly violating the Leninist party principles of leadership of the armed forces.

In this way Zhukov failed to live up to the party's trust. He proved to be a politically unsound person, inclining to adventurism both in his understanding of the prime objective of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and in his leadership of the Ministry of Defense.

In view of this, the plenary meeting of the Central Committee resolved to drop Zhukov from its Presidium and from the Central Committee itself. The secretariat of the Central Committee has been instructed to provide Zhukov with other work. The Central Committee is confident that in fulfillment of the decisions of the Twentieth Party Congress, party organizations will continue to bend their efforts to strengthening further the defense capacity of our Socialist state.

(The decision was adopted unanimously by all the members and alternate members of the Central Committee and the members of the Central Auditing Commission. It was approved by all the military men, Communist party and Government executives present at the meeting.)



"Basically our strength lies in the reverence for the entire body of knowledge and respect for the views of the other person. Moreover, we have recognized that the first step in any advancement of knowledge is the formulation of a question. All of those who see the importance of a doubt in the search for solutions of our major problems are contributing by that understanding to the progress of the intellectual man. We now know from recent experience that questions are more dangerous to the Communist System than atomic bombs."

—Eleanor Lansing Dulles, *Special Assistant to the Director, Office of German Affairs, Dept. of State, June 3, 1957.*

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Disarmament

November 4—The Soviet Union announces it will not attend U.N. Disarmament meetings while Subcommittee membership remains the same; the Soviet Union objects to the membership of the U. S., Britain, France and Canada who are signatories to NATO.

November 13—Western powers agree to add 10 new members to the Disarmament Commission, bringing the total membership to 21.

November 14—The General Assembly approves the resolution asking the Disarmament Commission to renew its efforts. Western negotiations with India lag over the increase of 10 members to the Commission. The Soviet Union warns that it will not attend meetings of the Subcommittee; it will also boycott the Commission unless Poland is chosen among the new 10 members.

November 19—The General Assembly votes to add 14 members to the Disarmament Commission, making a total of 25. The Soviet Union says it would still not participate in disarmament talks unless the General Assembly accepted an Albanian proposal to increase membership to 32. This last motion is defeated.

November 23—The Soviet Union refuses to participate in the Disarmament Commission at the same time that a Russian official declares that his country will consider a "serious" Western attempt to break the disarmament deadlock.

International Geophysical Year

November 3—The second Soviet satellite, carrying scientific instruments and a dog in a hermetically sealed container, is launched. The satellite weighs 1120.29 pounds; its orbit ranges as high as 1,056

miles from earth; it has a speed of 17,895 miles an hour.

November 4—Professor F. I. Dikushin of the Soviet Academy of Sciences reports that "new sources of power" were used to launch the second satellite.

November 16—It is reported that Aurora watchers, in connection with I.G.Y., have seen a double arc of northern lights.

NATO

November 5—Talks open in London concerning the wider distribution of nuclear weapons among NATO members.

November 12—U. S. Senator Henry M. Jackson issues a statement, with Administration backing, proposing the establishment of a missile training center where NATO nations could receive training in the use of nuclear weapons.

November 13—Criticism is voiced over the U. S.-British atomic weapons monopoly by delegates to the Military Committee of the Consultative Parliamentary Conference.

November 16—Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery announces his retirement from his NATO post as Deputy Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe effective September 20, 1958. He will also be released from active duty with the British Army.

November 28—The NATO Council agrees to limit the meeting scheduled for December to top government leaders, despite the illness of U. S. President Eisenhower, suffering a mild stroke. Vice-President Nixon may represent the U. S.

Organization of American States

November 14—Secretary General of O.A.S., Jose A. Mora, is reelected for a second 10-year term.

United Nations

November 13—The Economic Committee of

the General Assembly asks participants to review their obligations under the Technical Assistance Program of the U.N. with the possibility of increasing their commitments for 1958.

November 15—Lieutenant General Raymond A. Wheeler is appointed head of a mission to study the development of the Lower Mekong River Basin along the lines of the U. S. Tennessee Valley Authority. The nations to benefit from such a project would be Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

November 18—An 11-nation resolution calling for reunification of Korea is approved by the Political Committee of the General Assembly.

November 22—The General Assembly approves a budget resolution to assess member states for the continued costs of maintaining the U.N. Emergency Force.

West Europe

November 18—The European Coal and Steel Community tells U. S. bankers and executives that U. S. loans or other funds will be directly distributed to industry, and not channeled through the member governments.

November 29—The meeting to discuss the British-proposed free trade area is adjourned until after the New Year.

ARGENTINA

November 5—President of the Argentine Bank of the Nation Carlos Coll Benegas announces that the U. S. Export-Import Bank has refused a loan request of \$80 million.

November 20—Indonesia will provide 3 million tons of petroleum annually in exchange for Argentine goods.

BELGIAN CONGO

November 27—A \$40 million loan for highway development is granted by the World Bank, bringing the World Bank loans to the Belgian Congo to a total of \$110 million.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Canada

November 18—Governor General Vincent Massey's 5-year term of office is extended for one year for the second time.

Ceylon

November 12—It is reported that the Soviet Union has been asked to send teams to help explore possible crude oil deposits.

November 30—Over 12,000 striking dock workers are joined by 7,800 municipal workers, causing bus and water stoppages.

Ghana

November 13—The new Governor General, the Earl of Listowel, is sworn in.

November 19—Two Soviet delegates arrive in Ghana; it is expected that they will try to establish trade and diplomatic relations.

Great Britain

November 5—The Government announces that it will present legislation to create life peerages for men and women at this opening session of Parliament.

November 10—Yemeni Crown Prince Seif el Islam el-Badr arrives for talks with Britain on the Yemeni-Aden border. Aden is a British protectorate.

November 12—A Labor party attempt to censure the Government's economic policies and failure to promote industrial production and investment is defeated by Government supporters.

November 18—It is announced that Britain and France plan to unite their electric power systems resulting in an annual savings of \$840,000 for the 2 countries. The project is expected to be completed in 1960-1961.

November 21—British-Yemeni talks end without apparent success, according to reports.

November 27—Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd tells the House of Commons that U. S. patrol planes at British bases are armed with nuclear bombs.

India

November 2—Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker announces that his government will supply India with \$7 million in wheat under the Colombo Plan to alleviate India's food shortage.

November 16—Five nations—the U. S., Philippines, Britain, Colombia and Australia—place a resolution before the U.N. Security Council asking that U.N. representative to India and Pakistan Frank P. Graham try to negotiate the Kashmir question. The resolution also calls for the withdrawal of troops from that area to be followed by complete demilitarization.

November 17—Pakistan announces that it will support the 5-nation U.N. resolution on Kashmir.

November 18—India opposes the U.N. resolution.

November 20—The World Bank and 9 U. S. and Canadian banks loan 2 private steel companies in India a total of \$32,500,000. The loan is to enable India to raise steel production from 1 million to 2 million tons annually.

November 30—Nagaland rebels receive an amnesty from India, marking Nagaland's entry into the Indian Union tomorrow.

Malaya, Federation of

November 8—Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman reveals that he has received a letter from jungle Communist leader Chin Peng, Secretary General of the Malayan Communist party. Chin Peng offers to meet with the Prime Minister to discuss the termination of internal strife.

New Zealand

November 30—Elections for 80 parliamentary seats open.

The Labor party wins a slight victory over the Nationalist party, in power these last 8 years. Incomplete returns give the Laborites 41 seats; in 38 constituencies the Nationalists are ahead.

Pakistan

November 2—U. S. Ambassador James M.

Langley asks the U. S. to withhold payment of \$10 million in promised economic aid until an inquiry into possible corrupt allocation of the money by the government of Prime Minister Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy has been conducted.

November 6—Pakistan re-allocates \$10 million in U. S. economic aid to import "commodities like cement, iron and steel, gasoline and sugar."

November 28—The crisis over Pakistan's electoral law ends with a compromise in favor of Prime Minister Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar's Muslim League. The League wants the electorate divided along religious lines, with Muslims voting for Muslim representatives, etc.

South Africa

November 15—Clothing workers open a 7-day strike to protest a law that only whites can hold certain jobs within the industry.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Cyprus

November 26—Riots commemorate the second year of British curbs to put down Greek Cypriote nationalist violence.

November 29—Turkish Cypriotes form a new underground, island-wide organization replacing the smaller Volkan group.

Jamaica

November 11—Jamaica receives a new constitution granting internal self-government to this British colony.

Kenya

November 8—British Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd announces an increase of 6 Africans on the Legislative Council.

November 13—The 8 Africans on the Legislative Council reject the proposed addition of 6 African members to the Council. They call for a constitutional conference to investigate Kenya's political problems.

November 16—One thousand Merille tribes-

men attack 7 villages in northern Kenya, killing 26 persons.

BURMA

November 8—Headquarters of the Red Flag Communist faction (anarchistic Communists) is destroyed by Burmese troops.

CHILE

November 28—Chile breaks off diplomatic relations with Venezuela following Venezuela's arrest of a Chilean attache without satisfactory explanation.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

November 8—Chinese Ambassador to Warsaw, Wang Ping-nan, announces that Mao Tse-tung's projected visit to Poland is indefinitely postponed.

November 10—It is reported that Chinese students, teachers and university employees have been assigned to farm labor.

November 18—Effective January 1, as part of the Second Five Year Plan, limited decentralization of Chinese commerce, industry and finance will take place.

November 19—It is reported that top military leader Marshal (One-Eyed) Liu Po-cheng has been replaced as Inspector General of army training by General Hsiao Ke.

COLOMBIA

November 11—The Colombian government orders increases in farm production to offset a rise in food prices.

November 23—Leaders of the 3 political groups—Rightist Conservatives, moderate Conservatives and Liberals—end their differences over the joint candidate for president, moderate Conservative Guillermo Leon Valencia.

CUBA

November 12—Arrests of professional persons, lawyers and physicians, are reported throughout Cuba in an attempt to cut off aid to rebel forces led by Fidel Castro.

November 19—Thirty-one Cubans are seized

by the U. S. Coast Guard as they attempt to sail from Key West with arms and other supplies for Cuba's rebel troops.

November 22—Clashes at Marea del Portillo result in the deaths of 40 rebels and several soldiers, according to Army headquarters.

November 29—Presidential and congressional elections are scheduled for June 1.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

November 13—President Antonin Zapotocky dies of a heart attack.

November 19—The Parliament elects Antonin Novotny president. He also retains the position of First Secretary of the Communist party.

DENMARK

November 7—Denmark reveals that it has accepted the U. S. gift offer to supply 3 squadrons of modern jet fighters.

EGYPT

November 7—Egypt and Ghana agree to exchange diplomatic missions.

November 8—It is reported that the Cairo radio has begun to broadcast propaganda aimed at stirring Jordanians and Palestine refugees to rise against King Hussein of Jordan and to restore a pro-Nasser government there.

November 11—Arab nations meeting in Cairo agree to establish propaganda measures to offset anti-Arab, Zionist statements.

November 17—According to reports, the anti-Jordan campaign on the Cairo radio has been dropped.

November 18—Egyptian deputies visiting the Syrian parliament vote with Syria to urge the speedy implementation of the Syrian-Egyptian federation. In Cairo, the Egyptian parliament also endorses the proposed federation.

November 19—Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin announces that his country has agreed to give economic aid to Egypt. Details of the arrangement are not given.

November 20—It is revealed that the U. S. has unfrozen about \$10 million of Egypt-

tian assets in this country and has given Egypt \$600,000 for rural development under the terms of the 1953 agreement for the Egyptian American Improvement Service.

Details of the Soviet economic aid agreement with Egypt are revealed: a loan of 700,000,000 rubles, partly in the form of goods and services, is made available. Egypt has 12 years to repay.

ETHIOPIA

November 21—Hailemariam Kebede is chosen president of the Chamber of Deputies of Ethiopia's first elected parliament.

FINLAND

November 29—A business government headed by Rainer von Fieandt, Chairman of the Bank of Finland, is appointed by President Urho Kekkonen to end the 43-day old government crisis.

FRANCE

November 6—The 37-day government crisis, the longest since the war, comes to a close when the National Assembly accepts Centrist Radical Felix Gaillard as the new premier.

Gaillard negotiates a 3-month loan for \$595,240,000 with the Bank of France to lighten the load on the treasury.

November 7—Parliament approves the Bank of France loan negotiated by Gaillard.

November 12—The French Assembly votes to continue the government's powers to combat terrorism in Algeria.

November 19—The National Assembly upholds the new Cabinet's financial measures to cut down inflation and curtail dwindling treasury reserves.

Gaillard also wins approval on the question of France's right to handle the Tunisian arms question.

November 20—The Cabinet authorizes Premier Gaillard to halt the effects of a 24-hour strike by about half of France's 1,000,000 civil servants. He is empowered to conscript civil servants in essential public services.

November 21—Edouard Daladier is elected President of the Radical party.

November 23—Gaillard's own Radical party, under the direction of former Premier Pierre Mendes-France, presses him to accept Morocco's and Tunisia's offer to mediate the Algerian question.

FRENCH EMPIRE

Algeria

November 9—It is reported that Algerian rebels have attacked petroleum projects in the Sahara. Military troops have been ordered to the Sahara to safeguard oil personnel.

November 22—The French Army reports that it has virtually wiped out the Algerian rebels sabotaging petroleum developments in the Sahara: 42 rebels are killed and 10 are taken prisoner.

November 26—France offers to admit 10,000 observers at proposed elections for Algeria.

November 29—Foreign Minister Christian Pineau meets with Tunisian and Moroccan U.N. delegates (named by Algeria as its spokesmen) to discuss the Algerian question.

November 30—The National Assembly of France approves an Algerian reform bill: Algeria is to be divided into 6 or 7 districts having local autonomy; voting equality on a man per man basis between Europeans and Algerians is instituted. The result is to give Muslims control in those areas where they have a majority. Equal representation for Europeans will be preserved in the upper houses of local parliaments.

French West Africa

November 29—Emperor Kougri Naba's accession to the throne of the Mossi tribe is celebrated.

GERMANY (WEST)

November 10—The city-state of Hamburg votes the Social Democrats into office in city-state parliamentary elections. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's Christian Demo-

cratic Union receives only 32.3 per cent of the vote.

November 14—East and West Germany agree to trade \$260 million in goods in 1958.

GREECE

November 25—Prince George, uncle of the present King Paul, dies.

HAITI

November 11—Political amnesty is granted to all subversives with the exception of those involved in the plot of May 25.

HONDURAS

November 15—Ramon Villeda Morales, head of the Liberal party, is elected president by the Constituent Assembly.

November 19—Foreign Minister Jorge Fidel Duron resigns following Major Roberto Galvez Barnes' withdrawal yesterday from the military junta. Both protest that Morales should live up to his pledge to be elected by popular vote.

HUNGARY

November 9—Unusually low river levels cause a water shortage in Budapest.

November 19—Workers councils, recognized by the Hungarian regime in November, 1956, are to be replaced by factory councils, according to an announcement on the Budapest radio.

INDONESIA

November 8—President Sukarno declares that his country will resort to force if the U.N. once again refuses to discuss Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea.

November 30—Seven are killed and many are wounded when hand grenades are thrown at President Sukarno, who remains unharmed.

IRAN

November 12—Iran again attempts to press her claim to the British oil protectorate

of Bahrein: Shah Mohammed Pahlevi instructs the Cabinet to present a bill to the parliament to bring Bahrein under Iran's jurisdiction.

IRAQ

November 10—A \$40 million 5-year plan to improve rural conditions is announced.

November 11—Iraq and Morocco sign an amity agreement.

ISRAEL

November 14—The Syrian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission agrees to permit "legitimate" civilian work along their border.

November 19—The U. S. announces an increase of \$1,500,000 in rehabilitation and relief aid for Arab refugees.

November 21—Israelis and Jordanians clash in the Arab sector of Jerusalem. Jordan also accuses Israel of abducting a field worker from Faroun across the Jordan border.

November 23—Jordanians are sent into Israel to take hostages in retaliation for Israeli kidnapping of a Jordanian farmer. Two Israeli farmers escape from the attackers.

ITALY

November 11—The Po River floods; 5000 evacuees are removed from their homes.

November 14—Pietro Nenni's Left-wing Socialists, at a meeting of the Central Committee, approve a "unity of action" policy with Italian Communists.

JAPAN

November 16—Japanese income is up 12.8 per cent over last year's figure.

November 17—Premier Nobusuke Kishi leaves tomorrow for a goodwill tour of Southeast Asia.

November 19—William S. Girard is found guilty of shooting a Japanese woman scavenging for shell cases on a U. S. Army firing range. His 3-year sentence is suspended.

JORDAN

November 9—It is reported that Transjordanians in the army are supporting an anti-Western, pro-Nasser program.

November 10—King Hussein lashes out at Egypt's propaganda campaign against his government "with the intention of stirring mutiny."

November 11—Palestine refugees in Damascus, Syria, parade in the streets shouting death to King Hussein of Jordan.

November 13—King Hussein belittles the Arab Solidarity Pact as "not worth the paper it is written on." Under the agreement of last April, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria promised to replace the \$30 million subsidy Jordan received annually from Great Britain; only Saudi Arabia has paid.

November 14—King Saud of Saudi Arabia and King Faisal of Iraq ask Syria and Egypt to halt their vitriolic attacks on Jordan's king.

November 19—Jordan and Nationalist China sign a treaty of friendship.

November 25—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld plans to investigate Jordanian charges that Colonel Byron V. Leary, acting head of the Palestine Truce Supervision Organization, "is biased."

November 30—The U. S. informs Jordan that it will grant that country \$10 million in economic aid.

LAOS

November 1—Premier Souvanna Phouma announces his Cabinet's decision to take the Communist backed Pathet Lao movement into the government.

November 19—The administration of the 2 Pathet Lao provinces in northern Laos is transferred to the central government of Premier Phouma.

LEBANON

November 6—The Government thwarts a terrorist attempt to dynamite the Parliament building.

The Internal Security Council votes in favor of wide scale arrests by security forces to prevent further bombings.

November 19—The government imposes stringent restrictions on Palestine refugees in an effort to curb a wave of subversive activities.

November 27—Premier Sami es-Solh receives a vote of confidence on his pro-Western policy.

MEXICO

November 16—Minister of Labor and Social Security Adolfo Lopez Mateos is chosen as presidential candidate by the Administration's Party of Revolutionary Institutions.

MOROCCO

November 21—Minister of Economy Abderrahim Bouabid reports that he has agreed to postpone a decision to re-evaluate the Moroccan franc at the request of French officials.

November 24—King Mohammed V departs for talks with the U. S.

Moroccan sources reveal that the tribe of Ait Ba Amrane has revolted against Spanish authorities in Ifni, a Spanish enclave surrounded completely by Moroccan territory.

November 27—Spain sends military reinforcements to its bases in the Canary Islands and Spanish West Africa following the recent Moroccan rebellion at Ifni. All is reported quiet at Ifni.

King Mohammed V ends talks in Washington with U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. They agree to work out their differences on U. S. bases in Morocco.

November 28—Crown Prince Moulay Hassan orders the Moroccan Army to shoot at Spanish forces, whom he accuses of invading Morocco from the Spanish enclave at Ifni.

November 29—It is reported that fighting at Ifni has spread 265 miles into the Spanish Sahara. A reported 165 bombs have been dropped by Spanish planes.

NEPAL

November 6—Minister for Planning and Development M. R. Sharma declares that the

Nepalese need 50,000 tons of rice and corn to stave off famine.

November 14—Premier K. I. Singh resigns.

NETHERLANDS

November 6—Australia and the Netherlands agree on a joint policy to promote the eventual self-determination of the peoples of the island of New Guinea.

NICARAGUA

November 12—Nicaragua charges that a Costa Rican military patrol has violated Nicaraguan territory by entering homes and taking a Nicaraguan citizen prisoner.

PERU

November 5—Two strikers are killed in clashes with police. In the states of Moquegua and Tacna constitutional guarantees are suspended.

PHILIPPINES

November 12—Filipinos go to the polls to vote for president, vice-president, 8 senators and all 102 representatives.

November 16—President Carlos P. Garcia rides to victory on the Nationalist party ticket as almost complete returns assure his office. His opponents admit defeat.

November 18—Garcia's running mate, vice-presidential candidate Jose Laurel, Jr., is defeated. Liberal Diosdado Macapagal is elected vice-president.

November 23—The Philippines receive a \$21 million loan for a hydroelectric project from the International Bank.

POLAND

November 11—Three former Polish secret police officials of high rank, Roma Romkowski, Jozef Rozanski and Anatol Fejgin are sentenced to long terms in prison because of their participation in police terrorism from 1949 to 1953.

November 16—President Stanislaw Brodzki of the Union of Journalists assures his union's support of the present regime.

PORTUGAL

November 3—Over 1 million voters support the government backed candidates for election to the National Assembly (lower house). According to incomplete returns, every government candidate won his seat.

November 15—The Azores Common Defense Pact (1951) with the U. S. is extended until 1962.

November 26—The World Court decides that it has jurisdiction to hear Portuguese claims to the right of transit on Indian soil between her territories on India's West Coast.

SYRIA

November 1—The Chairman of the Syrian National Economic Development Council asserts that Syria will need \$170 million over the original estimate for 19 development projects which the Soviet Union had agreed to finance October 28, 1957.

November 5—Syria declares that it will ask the U.N. General Assembly to consider the question of Turkish troops unless they are withdrawn immediately from Syria's border.

November 6—Parliament approves the Syrian-Soviet technical and economic assistance pact of October.

Syria orders the military to fire on planes and patrols violating Syrian territory.

November 9—It is reported by the Government that Turkish and Syrian troops fired on one another at the northeastern end of their common border.

TUNISIA

November 14—Over France's protests, the U. S. and Britain agree to supply small arms to Tunisia. The U. S. will ship 500 M-1 rifles and 50,000 rounds of ammunition; Britain will send 350 Sterling submachine guns, 70 Bren guns and ammunition.

November 15—France, angered over arms delivery to Tunisia, wants "a clear and unequivocal solution" to the problem, according to French Premier Gaillard.

November 18—Ambassador Habib Bourguiba, Jr., son of the President, declares that the Soviet Union had offered arms to Tunisia and that the offer had been rejected.

November 21—Mohammed V and Bourguiba issue a communique following their earlier talks urging France and Algeria to negotiate their differences. They offer to act as mediators.

November 23—Tunisia withdraws its ambassador to Syria because of the presence in Syria of Tunisian Salah ibn Yusuf, leader of anti-government activities.

November 25—Cairo announces that it has shipped arms to Tunisia.

TURKEY

November 1—The Turkish Parliament reelects Celal Bayar for another presidential 4-year term after the recent elections.

November 2—Premier Adnan Menderes is reappointed premier.

November 8—Turkey ships \$5,500,000 in arms to Libya.

November 20—Cotton transactions are frozen except for those cotton stocks owned by the government. The government hopes to hold the price of cotton close to that of the world market so that it can be sold to France for foreign credits.

November 25—Premier Menderes announces his new Cabinet, composed of 2 new ministries and 4 new ministers.

THE U.S.S.R.

November 2—The reason for the dismissal of Marshal Zhukov as defense minister is given: Zhukov is charged with promoting his own "cult of the personality" within the army. He is dismissed from the Presidium and the Central Committee. (*For the text of this statement see pages 50-51.*)

Communist Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung arrives in Moscow in anticipation of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution on November 7.

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko says that his government prevented a Middle Eastern war by its support of Syrian charges against Turkey.

November 3—According to Soviet reports, it has developed the fastest and largest jet airplane passenger carrier in the world.

November 6—At the special session of the Supreme Soviet to celebrate the fortieth year of Bolshevik rule, Communist party leader Nikita Khrushchev suggests a top level meeting of capitalist and Communist countries.

Speaking before the Supreme Soviet, Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka and China's Mao preach the unity of the Communist bloc under the leadership of the Kremlin while reserving their right to follow their own roads to socialism.

November 7—The Soviet Union displays its military might in a parade through Red Square. Tactical atomic weapons are revealed.

November 13—Khrushchev calls Zhukov a remarkable military figure but a political failure.

November 15—Soviet scientists declare that their next project is to launch a satellite that will return in full or in part to earth.

It is said that Marshal Konstantin V. Rokossovsky has been appointed commander of the Transcaucasian military district.

November 22—At a meeting of 11 Communist nations with the Soviet Union in Moscow, a communique is issued calling for unity in opposing imperialism and capitalism abroad and for internal unity by eliminating deviationist elements. (*For the text of this communique see pages 42-47.*)

Communist parties of 64 nations endorse a manifesto supporting Soviet foreign policy and peace moves.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

November 7—Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson tells the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization meeting in Rome that the United States will not dump agricultural products abroad.

November 12—It is estimated that the corn crop for 1957 will be the third largest on record.

November 24—According to an "authorita-

tive source" quoted in *The New York Times*, the Cabinet approves Benson's plan to increase farm surplus exports by 50 per cent.

The Economy

November 2—The Pennsylvania and New York Central Railroads are considering a possible merger that would result in the largest railroad in the world.

November 14—The Federal Reserve System's Board of Governors approves a cut in the discount rate from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 per cent for 4 Federal Reserve Banks—New York, Atlanta, Richmond and St. Louis. The other 8 banks are expected to ask for similar approval.

November 15—Figures released by the Federal Reserve Board show that over-all industrial production in October fell to the lowest level since the 1956 steel strike.

November 21—Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell says he thinks the steady rise in prices is ended.

November 22—The Labor Department says that consumer prices did not rise in October, for the first time in 13 months.

Foreign Policy

November 7—It is reported that the United States has actually offered to give \$12 million to maintain UNEF in Egypt for the rest of 1957.

Responding to Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's suggestion for a high-level East-West meeting, the State Department notes that high level meetings can be "desired only if there are reasonable grounds for expecting that they would bring beneficial results."

President Eisenhower sends greetings to the Russian people on the 40th anniversary of the Russian Revolution.

November 8—It is reported from Washington that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has asked Premier David Ben-Gurion of Israel to allow U.N. officials to help mediate recent border incidents with Jordan.

November 11—President Dwight D. Eisenhower asks Adlai Stevenson, twice defeated Democratic candidate for the presidency,

to go with him to the NATO meeting in Paris in December.

United States Representative at the United Nations Walter H. Judd of Minnesota, says that the U. S. has asked the General Assembly to set up a \$100 million program, voluntarily financed, to advance underdeveloped areas.

November 12—Adlai Stevenson may go as a "consultant to the December NATO conference" but will not help a staff group to draft proposals for the President.

November 14—The State Department relaxes its 11-year-old ban on travel to Albania for persons with "compelling reasons."

November 15—The U. S. asks the Soviet Union to ease travel restrictions on U. S. citizens now banned from nearly one-third of Russian territory, and offers similar concessions for Russian travel in the U. S.

November 17—Stevenson says that the United States must work to rebuild mutual confidence in NATO; it is revealed that he will confer with Eisenhower before the December NATO meetings.

November 19—Dulles sketches a three-point program for strengthening Western Europe's defenses.

The U. S. begins to give out funds for scientific, educational and cultural projects in Israel.

November 20—Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy and French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau discuss mutual problems in Washington, including: arms for Tunisia, preparations for the NATO meeting, and the U.N. Assembly debate on Algeria.

Secretary Dulles says that if an attack were made on NATO forces, commanders in the field would make the decisions about counterattacking.

November 23—Secretary Dulles and West German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano confer in Washington.

November 28—Reversing its former statement, White House Press Secretary Hagerty tells newsmen that the President may attend the December NATO meeting if his physicians permit it.

Government

November 6—Bernard M. Shanley, Appoint-

ments Secretary for the President, resigns so he can run for the Senate seat now held by H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey.

November 8—William P. Rogers becomes Attorney General of the United States.

November 15—George V. Allen is sworn in as United States Information Agency director.

President Eisenhower is confined to his bed with a chill.

November 26—President Eisenhower suffers from a small blood clot or vascular spasm of the brain. His speech is impaired.

Vice-President Nixon declares that the President is still able to make his own decisions.

Adlai Stevenson declares that he will continue as State Department consultant on NATO.

November 27—The President is making excellent recovery from the mild stroke suffered yesterday.

Vice-President Nixon denies rumors that the President will resign. Nixon has been authorized to head meetings of the Cabinet, of the National Security Council and of congressional leaders next week.

November 28—The President attends Thanksgiving Day church services.

November 29—The President leaves for his Gettysburg farm.

The Science Advisory Committee is moved from the Office of Defense Mobilization into the Executive Office. Five additional new members are appointed.

Ambassador to Yugoslavia James W. Riddleberger's transfer to Athens is announced.

November 30—The U. S. Ambassador to Nationalist China, Karl L. Rankin, is transferred to the Yugoslav post.

Integration

November 11—A U. S. Appeals Court reverses a district court ruling and orders Prince Edward County, Virginia, and hence the rest of the state, to begin public school integration.

November 15—No regular Army troops are on guard at Central High School in Little Rock for the first time since September 25.

November 19—The Army announces that all

regular troops will leave Little Rock November 27.

November 21—Attorney General William P. Rogers announces the appointment of W. Wilson White as head of the Justice Department's new Civil Rights Division. Mr. White is an Assistant Attorney General.

Labor

November 1—George Meany, President of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., says that he is shocked by the extent of corruption in the labor union movement.

November 2—President of the United Textile Workers Anthony Valente resigns to enable his union to retain A.F.L.-C.I.O. membership. The Union was cited for corruption by the A.F.L.-C.I.O. in October.

November 4—A United States Court of Appeals upholds the preliminary injunction barring James F. Hoffa from assuming the Teamster presidency.

James G. Gross, President of the Bakery and Confectionery Workers, says he will not resign despite pressure from the A.F.L.-C.I.O., which has given the union until November 15 to get rid of Mr. Gross or be suspended.

November 5—Nathan W. Shefferman and his son invoke the Fifth Amendment in hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field.

November 6—A federal court jury decides that the United Automobile Workers did not make illegal political expenditures for television programs in the 1954 election campaign.

November 12—The National Labor Relations Board says that "hot cargo" contracts with truck lines and their common carriers are secondary boycotts and are banned by the Taft-Hartley Act. "Hot cargo" clauses allow a union to designate goods as "unfair" so its employees can refuse to handle them.

November 16—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. suspends the Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union of America because of corruption in the union.

November 17—Files of the International

Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners are subpoenaed by Senate rackets investigators.

November 21—Demonstrating against the New York-New Jersey Waterfront Commission, some 1500 longshoremen stage a wildcat strike.

November 28—The building trades unions threaten to secede from the A.F.L.-C.I.O.

Military Policy

November 4—The Wisconsin, last battleship of the United States fleet in operation, sails into New York harbor on her final cruise before entering the reserve fleet.

November 7—President Eisenhower names Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The President reveals the appointment in a television address about scientific achievement, in which he also tells the American people that the United States has solved the problem of returning a missile warhead from space to a target.

The Navy reveals the successful testing of its pilotless aircraft, the Regulus II, intended for use by atomic submarines.

November 8—A 2-year-old decision is reversed when McElroy announces that the Army will use its Jupiter-C rocket to launch earth satellites to supplement the Navy's program.

November 14—Assistant Secretary of Defense Wilfred J. McNeil says that the defense budget next year will be only a little higher than the current budget.

November 15—The Air Force reveals a successful test of the intercontinental missile Snark, which hit a target with "unprecedented accuracy" on a 5,000-mile run.

James R. Killian is sworn in as Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

November 19—The Secretary of Defense says that the United States will speed up its program of intermediate range missile production and deployment of weapons to West European allies.

Gordon Gray, Defense Mobilization Director, says that an emergency agency will

be established to control intercity transportation in war-time.

It is revealed in Washington that Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor is asking the Administration to spend between \$6 and \$7 billion in the next three years for an operational anti-missile missile.

November 20—It is revealed in Washington that the Air Force opposes the Army plan for an anti-missile missile.

The Defense Department reveals that Major General Donald J. Keirn of the Air Force will head an "integrated project office" for development of nuclear power for airplanes and missiles.

November 21—It is revealed in Washington that the National Security Council has accepted production plans for the Air Force intermediate range ballistic missile Thor.

Lieutenant General Clarence S. Irvine, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Materiel, reveals that "active" research programs are planned to develop space platforms and manned ballistic missiles.

The Defense Department announces that it will build a giant missile base near Cheyenne, Wyoming, for more than \$65 million.

November 22—The Air Force says that it has fired tiny artificial meteors out toward space.

It is revealed in Washington that a secret report urges the Administration to spend \$20 billion for a national network of fall-out shelters.

November 25—The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee opens an inquiry into the effectiveness of the national defense program.

November 27—McElroy reveals that he has ordered the Thor and Jupiter missiles for combat production; however, he points out that neither weapon is perfected.

Two Air Force jets flying non-stop Los Angeles to New York and back break 3 speed records.

November 29—General Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff, announces that intermediate and long-range missile development programs have been transferred to the Strategic Air Command from the Air Research and Development Command.

November 30—McElroy agrees to reconsider

the prohibition limiting army missiles to those of a 200-mile range. It is announced that authorization has been given for an Air Force launching site at Bomarc; a Ballistic Missile Force headed by Major General David Wade of SAC is ordered; other developments for missile speed up are listed.

Politics

November 5—Governor Goodwin J. Knight says he will not seek re-election as governor in 1958 and will run for a seat in the United States Senate instead, after talking to President Eisenhower and Vice-President Richard M. Nixon.

Democrat Robert Wagner is re-elected Mayor of New York with a plurality of 919,902.

Democrat Robert B. Meyner is re-elected Governor of New Jersey by a plurality of 203,613 votes, the largest number of votes ever cast for a Democrat in New Jersey. The Democrats control the New Jersey State Assembly for the first time in 20 years and increase representation in the State Senate.

Democrat J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., is elected Governor of Virginia, defeating Republican candidate Theodore Roosevelt Dalton.

November 6—The White House announces that the President will hold an unusually large bipartisan meeting at the White House with congressional leaders on December 3.

November 30—Senator William E. Jenner (R.) of Indiana will not seek another term in 1958, according to an announcement by the Republican State Chairman.

Supreme Court

November 25—The Supreme Court agrees to hear the cases of Rockwell Kent and

Walter Briehl challenging the State Department's right to withhold passports from persons refusing to sign non-Communist affidavits. The two men contest the affidavit regulation because it lacks congressional authorization.

The Supreme Court upholds the contempt of court conviction of Mrs. Oleta O'Connor Yates, one of the 9 California Communists for whom retrial was ordered by the Supreme Court on June 17.

VENEZUELA

November 4—President Marco Perez Jimenez calls off the presidential election scheduled for December 15. Instead a plebiscite asking whether Venezuelans approve of his regime will be put to the people.

November 8—Venezuela announces that it is ready to initiate its own aid program throughout Latin America.

YUGOSLAVIA

November 1—Yugoslavia renews a trade agreement with the Soviet Union for 1958.

November 15—In response to a West German announcement that it will reassess its economic ties with Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav government warns that it will retaliate if West Germany reneges on its economic obligation. Yugoslavia has a \$60 million credit with West Germany.

November 22—Yugoslav Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Veljko Micunovic, declares that his country did not sign the 12-nation Communist declaration of policy because "we did not agree with it." Yesterday, 11 Communist nations meeting in Moscow issued a Communist declaration with the Soviet Union. (*For the text of this declaration, see pages 42-47.*)

"... The only distinction between freedom and slavery consists in this: In the former state a man is governed by the laws to which he has given his consent, either in person, or by his representative: In the latter, he is governed by the will of another. In the one case his life and property are his own: in the other, they depend upon the pleasure of a master. . . . No man in his senses can hesitate in choosing to be free, rather than slave."

—Alexander Hamilton, Dec. 15, 1774.

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